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ABSTRACT
The nondelegation doctrine theoretically limits Congress’s ability to
delegate legislative powers to the executive agencies that make up the modern
administrative state. Yet, in practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has, since the New
Deal, shied away from enforcing any limits on congressional delegation. That
may change in the near future. In Gundy v. United States, the Court narrowly
upheld a delegation, and a dissent signaled deep doubts about the Court’s
longstanding “intelligible principle” standard and offered a new framework to
replace it. Subsequent events strongly suggest that the Court is poised to move
in the direction contemplated by the dissent in Gundy, drawing a line between
policy discretion, which cannot be delegated, and authority to fill up details or
find facts triggering policies, which can be. Whether observers’ view of the
prospect of Court-imposed limits on delegation is apocalyptic or euphoric,
virtually everyone expects such limits to be highly consequential.
While these opinions about the nondelegation doctrine are understandable,
they are ultimately speculative. This Article offers a more data-driven evaluation
of what implementation of the Gundy dissent’s line drawing would portend for
administrative law. Using the underexamined laboratory of the nondelegation
doctrine in the states, where the doctrine has always had more life than at the
federal level, this Article shows that states that adhere closely to the lines drawn
by the Gundy dissent are no more or less likely to invalidate statutes passed by
state legislatures than states that adhere to the intelligible principle formulation.
The lack of a relationship between doctrinal formulation and outcomes suggests
we will only know whether a revolution is afoot based on what the Supreme
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Court actually does over a series of cases, not on what it says it is going to do.
Moreover, the research findings suggest significant limitations on the ability of
the Gundy dissent’s approach to provide any ex ante guidance to the lower
courts, or even future Supreme Courts, about what the nondelegation doctrine
prohibits—an observation that suggests significant logistical and institutional
problems inherent in the entire project of resuscitating the doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Before Gundy v. United States,1 the nondelegation doctrine was little more
than an academic topic—the perfect device for teaching second- and third-year
law students about the formative choices that had been made long in the past to
enable the development of the modern administrative state. On paper, the
doctrine stands for the proposition that Congress may not delegate any of the
legislative power vested in Congress to any other actor, including the countless
administrative agencies that make up our de facto fourth branch of government.2
However, that paper requirement has only been observed in the breach. As a
leading casebook proclaims, “[i]n some sense, the entire field known as
‘administrative law’ represents the efforts of courts and legislatures to come to
terms with [the] fact” that the Court would not stand in the way of broad
delegations of policymaking authority from Congress to administrative
agencies.3 Some never quite stopped believing that the nondelegation doctrine
would yet bear fruit for opponents of the growing regulatory state. Legal scholar
Gary Lawson famously described the nondelegation doctrine as “the Energizer
Bunny of constitutional law: No matter how many times it gets broken, beaten,
or buried, it just keeps on going and going.”4 In point of fact, though, other than
in two outlier cases in 1935,5 the federal nondelegation doctrine has never been
invoked to invalidate any federal statute delegating power to an agency, and it
was, until quite recently, described as “dead.”6
After Gundy, all of that changed. Although the Court’s decision fit with the
larger historical pattern of failed nondelegation challenges, there was
1
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to a provision in the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)).
2
Id. (“The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another
branch of Government.”).
3
RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN & JODY FREEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES & MATERIALS 16 (8th ed. 2020).
4
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2002); see also Cynthia R.
Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 89 (2010) (noting the “remarkable
durability” of the nondelegation doctrine despite a remarkably bad track record).
5
Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
6
Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 839 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative
Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 419 (2015); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 145 (2005). One could fill an
entire volume collecting observations about the vitality of the doctrine. I’ll add a new one: it has essentially been
a zombie doctrine since 1935. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(claiming that Auer deference, which concerns deference to agency interpretations of their own ambiguous
regulations, had been “zombified”).
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considerably less consensus than the last time the Court decided a nondelegation
case.7 Speculation about where the Court might be going on nondelegation has
since reached a fever pitch. It started with Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in the case.8
Not only did Justice Gorsuch make clear that his views on nondelegation had
not changed a bit since his elevation to the Court,9 and not only did he apparently
persuade three of his colleagues10—including the generally cautious Chief
Justice Roberts—of the righteousness of his cause,11 but he also appeared to
overcome one of the most significant barriers to a return of the nondelegation
doctrine by articulating what appears to be a relatively justiciable three-part test
to replace the capacious “intelligible principle” standard.12 While Justice
Kavanaugh did not participate in Gundy, he later indicated that he too was
persuaded by Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, bringing the count of interested justices
to five.13 With the passing of Justice Ginsburg and her replacement by Justice
Barrett, who is likely sympathetic to Justice Gorsuch’s views as well,14 the
“Energizer Bunny” seems like it might actually power a revolution this time
around. All of this has left the field of administrative law in a state of debilitating
7
The Court had unanimously upheld a delegation of authority to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards at a level requisite to protect public health in Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations. 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). In Gundy, the Court upheld the delegation to the
Attorney General in SORNA by a vote of five to three, with a narrow concurrence from Justice Alito that
indicated substantial sympathy for the dissent’s position. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121, 2130–
31 (2019).
8
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
9
See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the provision later reviewed in Gundy was unconstitutional as a “delegation of legislative authority”).
10
Although Justice Alito did not join the dissent, and in fact voted with the majority to uphold the statute,
he nevertheless indicated his sympathy for Justice Gorsuch’s skepticism of congressional delegation. See Gundy,
139 S. Ct. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach
we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But . . . it would be freakish to single out the
provision at issue here for special treatment.”).
11
Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 2135–37. See generally Jonathan Hall, Note, The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting
the Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation, 70 DUKE L.J. 175, 201–02 (2020) (discussing what
Hall calls “the Gorsuch test”). The “intelligible principle” standard has been the go-to articulation of the doctrine
since the 1920s and has been interpreted to impose almost no limits on Congress’s ability to delegate. See Gundy,
139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (explaining the intelligible principle test and opining that the standard is
“not demanding”). What fundamentally distinguishes the intelligible principle formulation from Justice
Gorsuch’s preferred test, discussed infra notes 113–121 and accompanying text, is the idea that Congress need
only provide a “general policy” and some “boundaries” on the discretion of the agency. See Am. Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (explaining it is constitutionally sufficient for Congress to clearly delineate
a public agency’s general policy and boundaries).
13
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
14
At the very least, Justice Barrett is likely to embrace “more targeted delegation-based arguments”—
particularly those involving emergency suspensions of otherwise applicable laws. See Jonathan H. Adler, Amy
Coney Barrett’s “Suspension and Delegation,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 18, 2020), https://reason.com/
volokh/2020/10/18/amy-coney-barretts-suspension-and-delegation/.
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limbo: will the modern administrative state survive a reinvigorated
nondelegation doctrine?
This Article swims against the current in arguing that the changes in
doctrinal formulation envisioned by a possible majority of the Court in and of
themselves will not fundamentally change anything about how courts approach
the problem of delegation.15 This counterintuitive position is data-driven: this
Article looks to the experience in state courts, where versions of Gorsuch’s
alternative test have been implemented in hundreds of cases analyzing the
propriety of delegations of legislative power under state law, for evidence of
how a changed approach in federal court might pan out.16 At the state level,
unlike in the federal courts, there is substantial variation in outcomes within and
across states, making them a living laboratory for studying the likely impacts of
an invigoration of the nondelegation doctrine at the federal level.17 But this
Article finds that the form of the doctrinal test or standard is not a predictor of
these outcomes.18 Moreover, none of the doctrinal formulations of the
nondelegation doctrine has constrained massive changes over time in the pattern
of decision-making in state courts as courts adjust to the conditions of a modern
economy and a correspondingly more powerful state regulatory apparatus.19
While this Article finds that, consistent with other studies of state cases,
nondelegation challenges are far more likely to succeed across the board in state
court,20 this likely represents a kind of equilibrium in the distribution of power
between the federal and state governments, not some kind of qualitatively
different approach to the nondelegation doctrine.21 Many states have a standard
as liberal as the intelligible principle standard of the federal courts, insofar as
they permit the delegation of policymaking discretion. Many other states,
however, purport to draw a far more formalistic line between legislative and
executive power, or permit only the delegation of discretion to determine
“details” rather than “policies.” No matter what approach state courts take to the
15
To be sure, other scholars have expressed general skepticism about how far reaching a revival of the
nondelegation doctrine might be. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Nondelegation as Constitutional Symbolism, 88
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3863501); Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Nondelegation for the Delegators, 43
REGUL. 14, 15 (2020) (“If the Court’s practice with other revived constitutional doctrines is any guide, it may
take more to curb delegation’s reach.”); Andrew Coan, Eight Futures of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2020 WIS.
L. REV. 141, 147 (2020) (arguing for six possible futures in which the Court accomplishes little in the way of
curbing delegation). However, this article is unique in taking a data-driven approach to the question.
16
See infra Part II.
17
See infra fig.3.
18
See infra tbl.1, fig.4 & fig.5.
19
See infra fig.2.
20
See infra fig.2.
21
See infra Parts II.D & III.A.
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nondelegation problem, though, they converge on a fairly stable and meager
invalidation rate, particularly in recent years.
These data points carry several lessons pertinent to the ongoing debate over
the future of the nondelegation doctrine. The allure of Justice Gorsuch’s dissent
is its promise to provide a clear test for impermissible delegations of the
legislative power, and one that promises to vindicate certain policy concerns and
values that are otherwise allegedly unenforced by the current intelligible
principle standard’s permissiveness. Others have argued, though, that Justice
Gorsuch’s benchmarks look better on paper than they do in practice.22 For
instance, focusing on whether Congress has made all of the relevant policy
questions and left only “details” for the agency to fill up raises the question of
how one defines policies and differentiates them from details.23 And much the
same can be said about the criterion of allowing executive agencies to make the
determination about whether a factual predicate to the operation of a rule
otherwise set by Congress has occurred: one must then ask what factfinding is
and whether it can be sequestered from policymaking.24 The experience in the
states provides more reason to suspect that Gorsuch’s test is underspecified and
unlikely to lead to consistent determinations—instead, other factors, such as
ideology and the institutional capital of the Court, would be likely to do the
heavy lifting.25
This, in turn, raises questions about what instituting the test would
accomplish. The experience in the states suggests that Justice Gorsuch’s test, as
underdefined as it is, is unlikely to realize many of the benefits of hard-edged
rules.26 In the states, review remains irreducibly stochastic, subject to massive
historical fluctuations, and ultimately perhaps unpredictable for legislators
seeking to draft compliant statutes. These features of the doctrine undermine the
22
See Hall, supra note 12, at 202–06 (collecting practical concerns unaddressed by Justice Gorsuch’s
Gundy dissent).
23
Id. at 211–12 (“The line between ‘policy’ and ‘details’ can be so easily blurred as to render the
distinction almost unenforceable.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 82 (1985) (noting the distinction between vague and specific
conferrals of authority is “not without its own difficulty” even though “the antidelegation commentary views the
distinction as nonproblematic”).
24
Lawson, supra note 4, at 365 (describing the holding in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), in which
the Court purportedly applied the basic rule that contingent legislation is constitutional to a tariff statute that was
triggered by an executive factfinding that there were “unequal” or “unreasonable” trade restrictions imposed by
another country but refused to explain how one can simply “find[]” that these conditions were present without
divining the line between executive and legislative power).
25
To be sure, it is a separate question of what drives court decision-making if not doctrine, and this Article
only begins to scratch the surface of that inquiry. See infra notes 202–04.
26
See infra Part III.
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kind of structured dialogue between the Court and Congress that could lead to
systemic changes in how the separation of powers system works. Instead, the
uncertainty inherent in an invigorated nondelegation review suggests that the
only impact such review could be expected to produce would be to provide
occasional symbolic shocks to Congress. While this kind of “shot across the
bow” approach might not be meaningless,27 it represents a far less ambitious,
and potentially much more dysfunctional, constitutional project. As such, these
limitations suggest a rethinking may be in order about whether the juice is worth
the squeeze when it comes to the nondelegation doctrine.
This Article begins in Part I with a review of the federal nondelegation cases,
the arguments for and against the modern approach to nondelegation, and the
Gundy decision’s injection of uncertainty. Part II turns to the states, building on
recent work on the operation of state administrative law to draw insights for
federal administrative law. It presents analysis of an original panel dataset of
state nondelegation cases from the mid-1800s to present day that shows the
impacts of doctrine both across and within states over time. Part III then draws
lessons for contemporary debates over the nondelegation doctrine. In the end,
this Article concludes that the project of giving life to the nondelegation doctrine
would be more work than its supporters have often suggested.
I.

THE “NEVER-ENDING HOPE”

For many, invigoration of the nondelegation doctrine is a “never-ending
hope.”28 It is never-ending because, for nearly a century, the Supreme Court has
refused to strike any delegation of legislative power to executive agencies. It is
a hope because, according to critics of this state of affairs, breathing life into the
doctrine might mean the return of a Constitution supposedly in exile since the
New Deal.29 But, almost invariably, the Court has disappointed those who wish
to see it meaningfully constrain the growth of administrative power. This Part
synthesizes caselaw and commentary on the nondelegation doctrine to
underscore the burgeoning debate over the doctrine’s future and the need for the
proponents of a renewed doctrine to articulate justiciable standards that cut

27
In parallel research, Elliott Ash and I explore how strong an effect the nondelegation doctrine has on
state legislative behavior and we tentatively find that there is a statistically detectable effect on the propensity to
delegate, though the effect is substantively quite small. See Daniel E. Walters & Elliott Ash, If We Build It, Will
They Legislate? Empirically Testing the Potential of the Nondelegation Doctrine to Curb Congressional
Abdication (Oct. 21, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
28
Kristin E. Hickman, Gundy, Nondelegation, and Never-Ending Hope, REGUL. REV. (July 8, 2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/08/hickman-nondelegation/.
29
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1 REGUL. 83, 83–84 (1995).
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closer to the bone but do not fundamentally imperil modern government. Part
I.A starts with an historical overview of the nondelegation doctrine’s
foundations—the Vesting Clause of Article I and early Supreme Court decisions
that recognized the existence of such a doctrine. Part I.B recounts the subsequent
history of the Court’s nondelegation decisions from the late 1800s to the very
recent past, showing how the Court has almost invariably shied away from
enforcing the doctrine. Part I.C then summarizes the persistent lines of critique
of this pattern of nonenforcement. Finally, Part I.D explains how Gundy has
scrambled this area of the law by indicating a willingness to recalibrate the
Court’s role in nondelegation cases and offering a test purportedly capable of
dividing unconstitutional delegations from constitutional delegations.
A. The Roots of the Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine reflects deep and unresolved ambiguities about
the extent to which the U.S. Constitution requires that the three branches of
government be hermetically sealed off from one another, subject to certain
explicit exceptions where the framers chose to subject the exercise of one power
to the checks of a coordinate branch of government.30 Unlike many state
constitutions,31 the U.S. Constitution neither explicitly provides for the
separation of powers nor prohibits the delegation of any of these powers to other
actors. Instead, it implies as much through the vesting of powers in particular
branches.32 As conventionally understood, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits
the subdelegation of quintessentially legislative powers—the power to make
laws—to actors outside the legislative branch.
Until just the last twenty years, most observers accepted that there was, in
fact, an implicit limitation on delegation of the legislative power in the framers’
30
See Farina, supra note 4, at 89–90 (noting that, while it is “typically accepted as given” that the
Constitution bars delegation of legislative power, the “Constitution’s test is of little help, for it says nothing
explicit about delegating the power Article I confers”); Lawson, supra note 4, at 335–36 (noting, but disagreeing
with, Justice Stevens’s claim in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), that the Constitution’s
silence about nondelegation means that it does not exist).
31
Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals
in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190–91 (1999) (surveying the states and noting “[t]he overwhelming
majority of modern state constitutions contain a strict separation of powers clause” in the sense that the clause
“not only divides power between the various branches but also instructs that one branch is not to exercise the
powers of any of the others”).
32
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”).
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original understanding, even if the boundaries of this limitation were murky in
practice.33 To strengthen the inference from textual silence, proponents of the
nondelegation doctrine argue that the framers understood and self-consciously
incorporated the thinking of constitutional theorists Locke and Montesquieu on
the question.34 However, even the idea that the nondelegation doctrine exists is
no longer a matter of consensus. Recent scholarship examining the original
understanding of the meaning of the vesting of legislative power in Congress
has suggested that the nondelegation doctrine existed at the founding but had a
drastically different scope and purpose than conventionally assumed. For
instance, legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argued that historical
evidence suggests the nondelegation doctrine only barred the delegation of
certain core institutional powers of Congress—namely, the power to vote on
bills.35 More recently, Professors Julian Davis Mortensen and Nicholas Bagley
further unsettled the originalist case for the nondelegation doctrine with their
argument that the original understanding, and even Locke’s thinking, evinces

33
Lawson, supra note 4, at 340 (“The Constitution clearly—and one must even say obviously—
contemplates some such lines among the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The Vesting Clauses, and
indeed the entire structure of the Constitution, make no sense otherwise.”); see also Jennifer Mascott, Early
Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1388, 1395 (2019) (arguing that, while the Vesting
Clause alone may not clearly contemplate a nondelegation doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine can be sourced
to “structural separation-of-powers principles” that “help ensure that the representative interests of people
electing legislators from throughout the country are represented in policy proposals”). Since Gundy, a number
of historical accounts have questioned whether the founders ever understood the nondelegation doctrine, even if
understood as a thing, as prohibiting the kinds of delegation of coercive lawmaking authority that critics of
delegation detest. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative
Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J.
1288, 1327 (2020) (finding that Congress delegated capacious authority in early tax laws, and that this authority
to make rules was “coercive,” contra efforts by originalist scholars to explain away other early congressional
acts); Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding, GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 3–4) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3654564). But these
historical accounts do recognize the conventional wisdom that the nondelegation doctrine exists in principle. See
Parrillo, supra, at 1299 (“At most, these other sources might possibly indicate that there is some abstract,
unspecified limit on delegation (I assume arguendo there is) . . . .”).
34
Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. 1490, 1518 (2021) (arguing the
“nondelegation principle can be traced to John Locke’s Second Treatise, which was deeply influential on the
Founding generation”); id. at 1526 (questioning whether it would have been possible for anyone not to
understand Montesquieu’s statement—that “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty”—as an adoption of a nondelegation
principle); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2003) (citing JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government,
in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, § 141 at 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690));
id. at 1317 (linking James Madison’s Federalist No. 47 with Montesquieu’s separation of powers principle).
35
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721,
1756 (2002).
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only a concern that the legislature not permanently delegate (i.e., alienate) its
authority to legislate.36
Notwithstanding these rear-flank attacks on the pedigree of the principle, the
Court has long acted as if there is such a thing as the nondelegation doctrine—
one that encompasses and restricts, at least in theory, the temporary assignment
of discretionary policymaking authority to other actors, namely executive
agencies—although there is some debate about when, exactly, this
understanding emerged. The earliest U.S. Supreme Court case in this area, The
Cargo of the Brig Aurora,37 largely sidestepped a nondelegation argument
against Congress’s commitment of discretion to the President to determine
whether to lift an embargo on France and Britain depending on whether they had
come to agreeable terms with the United States.38 The Court did seem to imply
that there would be no impermissible delegation of legislative authority if the
only discretion to be exercised was a factual determination of whether a
predicate condition for the operation of the policy set by Congress was
satisfied,39 but nothing about the opinion suggests that delegation would be
limited to those circumstances.
Several years later, the Court returned to the question in Wayman v.
Southard, where challengers argued that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
impermissibly delegated authority to federal courts to adopt by reference state
rules of civil procedure.40 Here, unlike in Brig Aurora, the Court explicitly
acknowledged the existence of the nondelegation doctrine with respect to
“powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative,” but simultaneously
acknowledged a line “has not been exactly drawn” separating subjects of “less
interest” in “which a general provision may be made, and power given to those

36
Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
308–11 (2021). Mortenson and Bagley’s article inspired several responses attempting to rehabilitate the
originalist pedigree of the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Wurman, supra note 34, at 1493–94; Aaron Gordon,
Nondelegation Misinformation: A Rebuttal to “Delegation at the Founding” and Its Progeny 2 (Mar. 25, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561062).
37
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382 (1813) (reviewing the constitutionality of the Non-Intercourse Act of
1809).
38
Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 393–94 (2017) (“[T]he Court left the President’s statutorily specified role in triggering the trade embargo
to the side and focused on the legislature’s power to exercise its own discretion to extend the embargo
conditionally ‘upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.’” (citing Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 388)).
39
Id. at 394 (“Implicitly, the framing of the opinion suggested that the President acted simply as a factfinder, not as a lawmaker.”).
40
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 3–4 (1825).
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who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”41 The Court
nevertheless held that the delegation was well within the outer boundaries of
permissible delegations, all without attempting to provide meaningful guidance
on the “precise boundary” line.42 Thus, whatever the framers’ understanding
might have been, by 1825 the Marshall Court had recognized the basic contours
of the modern nondelegation problem and endorsed the theoretical existence of
constitutional constraints on delegation, all while refusing to provide any
meaningful guidance about its understanding of the limits of the principle.

B. The Maturation of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Despite this fairly early recognition of a recognizably modern understanding
of the nondelegation problem, the doctrine was virtually absent for nearly a
century, as Congress engaged in substantial delegation of legislative power to a
burgeoning administrative state.43 Even when the doctrine was at its height of
raw potentiality, many of the most novel and sweeping delegations of authority
never found their way to the U.S. Supreme Court44—an oddity that surely casts
doubt on the contemporary bar’s understanding of the stringency, or at least the
enforceability, of the nondelegation doctrine. The Court finally returned to the
doctrine in 1892 in Field v. Clark,45 a case involving similar facts to Brig Aurora
and resulting in a similar decision. The Court held that there was no
constitutional problem with a statute that delegated to the President the power to
raise tariffs on nations that did not engage in fair terms of commerce with the
United States.46 The delegated discretion did “not, in any real sense, invest the
President with the power of legislation,” but merely gave the President power to
“ascertain[] the existence of a particular fact” that served as a predicate to the
operation of the policy set by Congress.47
As Professors Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano have recently shown,
Field ended the long hiatus of the nondelegation doctrine at the Court, touching
off a spate of nondelegation challenges—many returning to the scenario of

41

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43, 46.
43
See, e.g., Parrillo, supra note 33, at 1327; Chabot, supra note 33.
44
See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285–86 (2012) (arguing that “our failure to engage with the realities
of administration in the first century of the Republic caused us to misunderstand the administrative law of that
period—indeed to ignore the administrative constitution that was forged between the Founding and the passage
of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887”).
45
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
46
Id. at 692.
47
Id. at 692–93.
42
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Wayman, where cases clearly involved the exercise of policymaking discretion,
and none of which leveraged the doctrine to strike an Act of Congress.48 Yet it
was another tariff case where the Court made it clear that, while the
nondelegation doctrine exists as an academic matter, its purview is narrow. In
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, the Court held that the delegation of
authority to adjust tariffs so as to eliminate inequities in the prices of goods as
they fluctuated in commerce did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.49 In
applying the nondelegation doctrine, the Court emphasized a functionalist
inquiry focused on the “common sense” and “inherent necessities of the
governmental co-ordination,” and stated that the nondelegation doctrine would
not be violated “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle” to which the delegee could “conform” its discretionary acts.50 The
“intelligible principle” standard came to be the dominant formulation of the
nondelegation doctrine and was never thought to be particularly onerous.51 All
Congress needs to do is provide some general guidance about how delegee
agencies should exercise their discretion (e.g., what kinds of considerations are
relevant and what the subject matter limits on the delegation are).52 Congress
need not actually make the policy decisions, nor eliminate agency discretion.
The inexorable retreat of the nondelegation principle came to an abrupt
pause, however, in 1935, in two cases involving unprecedently broad
delegations in New Deal statutes. For the first time—and, as it turns out, the
last—the Court held that Congress impermissibly delegated its legislative
authority to an executive agency.53 The first case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
involved the constitutionality of Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery

48
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 397–401 (discussing St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois,
185 U.S. 203 (1902), Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904), Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S.
364 (1907), Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506 (1911), Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912), Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus.
Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924), Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933), Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), and United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932)).
49
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
50
Id. at 406, 409.
51
Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236 (2005) (noting that the intelligible principle standard is the “dominant modern
formulation” and that the standard is treated as a “nullity” by the courts).
52
Hickman, supra note 15 (manuscript at 9) (“The only requirement, according to the [J.W. Hampton]
Court, was that Congress provide some degree of guidance to cabin Executive Branch discretion.”).
53
The Court did strike a delegation to private actors in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311
(1936) (“This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or
an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse
to the interests of others in the same business.”).
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Act (NIRA), which addressed falling prices of petroleum products by allowing
the President to remove such products from interstate commerce through
regulations.54 The implementing regulations required producers to keep and file
records relating to petroleum product sales.55 The Court, reviewing its
nondelegation precedents, noted that “in every case in which the question has
been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which
there is no constitutional authority to transcend.”56 It then held that Section 9(c)
“goes beyond those limits” because “Congress has declared no policy, has
established no standard, has laid down no rule.”57 The second case, A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,58 similarly involved a provision of the
NIRA, this time Section 3, which gave the President the authority to approve
codes of fair competition for entire industries.59 These codes were to be drafted
by industry trade associations and approved if the President was satisfied that
they were consistent with the overarching policy of the NIRA, defined in Section
1 as including the goals of removing obstructions to the “free flow of interstate”
commerce, to “provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of
industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and
maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental
sanctions and supervision,” and “to eliminate unfair competitive practices,”
among other open-ended aims.60 The Court again rejected this delegation,
stating the following:
Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no
standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact

54

293 U.S. 388, 406 (1935). Section 9(c) reads as follows:
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order
prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a
State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection
shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months,
or both.

Id.
55

Id.
Id. at 430.
57
Id. Notably, Justice Cardozo dissented, finding in other provisions of the NIRA the policy the majority
found lacking. Id. at 434 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (conceding the need for a standard in the Act “to uphold the
delegation” but “deny[ing] that such a standard is lacking in respect of the prohibitions permitted by this section
when the act with all its reasonable implications is considered as a whole”).
58
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
59
Id. at 534–35.
60
Id.
56
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determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to
prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, § 3 sets up no
standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in section one.61

This time, even Justice Cardozo did not hold out, stating that “[t]he delegated
power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant.”62
Whether Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry represent a brief reversion
to a more formalistic approach to nondelegation cases than cases like J.W.
Hampton had suggested was appropriate, or an articulation of a new rule to
govern just the exceptionally broad delegations in the NIRA, is a debatable
point. Professor Cary Coglianese has argued that these cases reflect the doctrinal
principle, consistently adhered to ever since (if only because Congress has never
again attempted to delegate so broadly), that judges should “invalidate only
those statutory grants of lawmaking authority that approximate one of
Congress’s enumerated powers.”63 On this account, the NIRA provisions struck
in these cases fell at the outer bounds of what is theoretically possible in their
combination of delegated discretion and power, and essentially forced the
Court’s hand, since the Court had acknowledged there must be some line ever
since Wayman v. Southard. The other major explanation involves politics: the
Court briefly resisted the expansion of federal regulatory power during the New
Deal before acceding to it.64 It is difficult to discern which of these explanations
fits the data better, in part because the record since has been so lopsided—never
again has the Court struck down an Act of Congress for violating the
nondelegation doctrine by delegating legislative power to an agency, even
though Congress has routinely come quite close to the line identified by
Coglianese. Just four years after Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, the
Court resumed upholding New Deal statutes against nondelegation challenges,

61

Id. at 541.
Id. at 551.
63
Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2019); see also
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 402 (“The Court thought the early New Deal statutes were unique in
establishing ‘no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which’ the President should or
should not act.”).
64
David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm that the Court Should
Substantially Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 229–30 (2020) (opining that “the Justices did seek to
insulate the Court from political turmoil” by using the “unmanageability of the intelligible principle test” to
“sidestep the potentially troublesome issue of delegation”).
62
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finding that they did not “abdicate, or . . . transfer to others, the essential
legislative functions with which [Congress] is vested by the Constitution.”65
That is not to say there have not been flirtations. In the early 1980s, Justice
Rehnquist, in the Benzene Case66 and then again in the Cotton Dust Case,67 tried
but ultimately failed to revive the doctrine in the context of a delegation of
authority to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to regulate
worker exposure to a standard that “most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity.”68 In 1989, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority’s
opinion in Mistretta v. United States, which upheld a delegation of authority to
the U.S. Sentencing Commission to set sentencing guidelines, arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine should not be so toothless as to allow Congress to create
a “junior-varsity Congress” that flouted the separation of powers.69 Around the
turn of the century, a lower court held that a construction of Section 109(b) of
the Clean Air Act violated the nondelegation doctrine.70 The provision instructed
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set ambient “air quality
standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety,
are requisite to protect public health,” but it did not permit the consideration of
costs.71 The Supreme Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations
disagreed with the lower court that there was a nondelegation violation, holding
that “[t]he scope of discretion § 109(b)(1) allows is in fact well within the outer
limits of our nondelegation precedents,”72 even though it excluded consideration
65
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939); see also United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533,
574 (1939) (stating that “Congress needs specify only so far as is reasonably practicable”); Mulford v. Smith,
307 U.S. 38, 49 (1939) (holding that an agency’s authority to make adjustments to marketing quotas was
governed by instructions about the “considerations which are to be held in view in making these adjustments”);
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398–99 (1940) (upholding an agency’s discretion to set
maximum prices and stating that “the effectiveness of both the legislative and administrative processes would
become endangered if Congress were under the constitutional compulsion of filling in the details beyond the
liberal prescription here”); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423–24 (1944) (upholding a delegation of
authority to set commodity prices and stating that Congress “has laid down standards to guide the administrative
determination of both the occasions for the exercise of the price-fixing power, and the particular prices to be
established”).
66
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
67
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust Case), 452 U.S. 490, 543–44 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
68
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
69
488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
71
Id. at 1057 (reviewing EPA’s construction of 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
72
531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
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of costs and called on the EPA to set a standard for non-threshold pollutants that,
as a scientific matter, had no known safe level of exposure.73
And, of course, it is possible to hear echoes of the central concerns of the
nondelegation doctrine in other, less freighted contexts. Legal scholar Cass
Sunstein, for instance, identified “nondelegation canons” at work in the Court’s
ordinary statutory interpretation cases, with the Court adopting saving
interpretations of statutes to avoid a head-on collision with the nondelegation
line of cases.74 More recently, some have seen echoes in the emerging concept
of the major questions approach to Chevron cases.75 And then there is the closely
related domain of review for unconstitutional vagueness.76
Yet, by the time of Whitman, frontal assaults on the administrative state
through the nondelegation doctrine began to feel like shadow boxing. Vermeule
describes it well:
[W]hen it came time to act, as opposed to venting one’s constitutional
frustrations in concurrence and dissents—well, it never did quite
happen. Justice Scalia’s Mistretta dissent became his brusque opinion
in Whitman v. American Trucking, sweeping aside a serious
nondelegation challenge to the Clean Air Act. Jam yesterday
(yesterday being 1935), and jam tomorrow, but never jam today.77

C. The Increasingly Fraught Debate Over Nondelegation
Over the same few decades that the Court seemed to abandon any judicially
administrable limit on Congress’s power to delegate to agencies, academic
critics began to sharpen their blades and lay the intellectual foundation for an
eventual change in the Court’s approach. These efforts take several forms, but
Professor Joseph Postell groups them into three buckets: 1) arguments from a
73

Id. at 475.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) (emphasis omitted); see
also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 224–28
(2000) (identifying a trend toward narrowly interpreting statutes to avoid nondelegation problems, but critiquing
that trend as inconsistent with the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine to “ensure that Congress makes
important statutory policy”).
75
See Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2044 (2018) (arguing that the “major questions
doctrine is a clear statement rule which reinforces the nondelegation doctrine”).
76
See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting a possible
argument that the “vagueness doctrine is really a way to enforce the separation of powers—specifically, the
doctrine of nondelegation,” but rejecting that understanding of the source of the rule since the Vesting Clauses
provide a basis for the nondelegation doctrine that is more inclusive than the Due Process Clause).
77
Adrian Vermeule, Never Jam Today, YALE J. ON REGUL. (June 20, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/
nc/never-jam-today-by-adrian-vermeule/ (citations omitted).
74
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position of separation of powers formalism; 2) arguments about political
accountability, or the lack thereof, in a world with unconstrained delegation; and
3) arguments from fiduciary principles and a theory of popular sovereignty.78
Briefly, the first argument from separation of powers formalism starts from
the theory that there must be limits to Congress’s ability to delegate its power,
because otherwise the separation of powers would be a sham and could be
eviscerated by reshuffling the distribution of power through ordinary
legislation.79 While that starting premise has carried the day in other contexts—
most notably in the context of the legislative veto—where the constitutional text
provides harder lines,80 it has not won over many converts here, where the
textual hooks for the doctrine are minimal. The second argument about political
accountability has found more traction. The argument here, largely developed
by political scientists like Ted Lowi81 and Morris Fiorina,82 and picked up by
legal scholars like David Schoenbrod,83 John Hart Ely,84 Peter Aranson, Ernest
Gellhorn, and Glenn Robinson,85 is that allowing Congress to delegate freely
allows it to claim responsibility for the act of delegating—as if it were the same
as the actualization of policy—and then avoid responsibility for the actions of
the delegee when things go wrong, diminishing both democratic control and
social welfare.86 The delegation, by obscuring who is doing the real work of

78

Joseph Postell, The Nondelegation Doctrine After Gundy, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 280, 283–90

(2020).
79
Lawson, supra note 4, at 340 (stating that if delegation were permissible, the “Vesting Clauses, and
indeed the entire structure of the Constitution” would “make no sense”).
80
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983) (invalidating a one-house legislative veto of executive
immigration determinations as a violation of the bicameralism and presentment clauses of the U.S. Constitution);
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (invalidating a line-item veto authorization as a violation
of the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
81
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92 (1st ed. 1969).
82
MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989).
83
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION 10 (1993).
84
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132–33 (1980).
85
Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glenn O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56 (1982).
86
It is worth noting Professor Jerry Mashaw’s important critique of the accountability-based logic for
strict limits on delegation. In essence, Mashaw argued that the executive branch, due to its national electorate
and other institutional features, is more accountable to the people than is Congress. On this account, broad
delegation to the executive branch actually enhances political accountability, even if it comes at the expense of
legislative power. Mashaw, supra note 23, at 95–99. This point has been foundational to one prominent theory
of administrative law—presidential administration—that stands in some tension with a Congress-centric model.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1953, 1954, 1957 (2015) (positing that presidential administration—as advocated by Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001), and supported by broad delegations of the kind
Mashaw supported—represents a triumph of a “process” tradition in administrative law over a “positivist”
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governance, breaks the chain of accountability that allows the voting public to
determine whether it approves of the direction of public policy and to make a
change if it does not. Finally, and more recently, critics working with fiduciary
law principles and a notion of popular sovereignty have posited a third argument
that, while delegation from the sovereign people to administrative agencies is
not per se objectionable, further “subdelegation” of that sovereign legislative
power by a mere trustee (Congress) violates principles of constitutional selfgovernance.87 On this theory, the nondelegation doctrine is essentially absolute
in its command because the agent or trustee simply has only those powers that
are explicitly delegated to it by the principal, We the People.88 On this account,
the lack of a textual hook might even be thought to cut in favor of a sweeping
nondelegation doctrine—there is no nuanced linguistic formulation to allow
exceptions to creep in.
As influential as they have been, arguments in this milieu have not
convincingly addressed a serious problem with the nondelegation doctrine—that
its (re)birth would have serious, if not fatal, implications for modern regulatory
governance.89 Some 300,000 statutes currently on the books, many of them
regulatory super-statutes,90 might be vulnerable to challenge under a changed
tradition that privileges legal formalisms, and that this development subverted a “grand synthesis” between these
two warring traditions).
87
Postell, supra note 78, at 287–90 (citing, as a principal proponent of this view, PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377–402 (2014), and GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF
ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017)). The bar on further subdelegation is often
supplemented by reference to the Latin phrase delegate postestas non potest delegari, which describes the
agency law principle that “[o]ne, who has a bare power or authority from another to do an act, must execute it
himself, and cannot delegate his authority to another.” Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata
Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 168, 168 (1929)
(citation omitted). But see Farina, supra note 4, at 91–92 (“Yet this rule—captured in the delegate potestas
maxim—only begins the analysis. A second general rule is that ‘authority to conduct a transaction includes
authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish
it.’”).
88
Postell, supra note 78, at 290 (“By focusing on the fact that the people are the only rightful possessors
of political authority, the Framers implicitly argued that government could not alter the Constitution’s
organization of political authority.”).
89
Cf. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019) (opining if the delegation at issue in Gundy
“is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need to give
discretion to executive officials to implement its programs”); see also Sean P. Sullivan, Powers, But How Much
Power? Game Theory and the Nondelegation Principle, 104 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2018) (noting that none
of the arguments in favor of a stricter nondelegation doctrine “can easily reconcile the nondelegation principle
with the existence of the modern administrative state; at least, not without either hollowing out the nondelegation
principle or demanding radical reorganization of government”).
90
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) (defining
a super-statute as a law that establishes “a new normative or institutional framework for state policy,” sticks in
the “public culture,” and, as a result, has a “broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners
of the statute”). Elsewhere, Eskridge and Ferejohn have included regulatory statutes in their definition of super-
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nondelegation doctrine.91 Even the threat of litigation could lock up the gears of
government.92 This is particularly problematic in light of the many existential
policy challenges facing the nation. Addressing climate change, for instance,
agencies have relied on decades-old delegations of authority to do what they can
at the margins.93 This is not something agencies prefer to do; it would be far
easier to be able to cite a brand-new statute explicitly authorizing the EPA to
implement a national cap-and-trade system rather than to rely on authorities that
were crafted with different problems in mind. But if new legislation was not
possible in 2009, when Congress considered but failed to pass such a statute, it
is hard to see how it is remotely possible now, in an even more gridlocked and
polarized environment.94 In this situation, opening the floodgates to court review
of the delegations agencies necessarily rely on to do incremental work is
tantamount to taking a stance against climate policy in general.95 Perhaps closer
to home for those affected by COVID-19, agencies from the Food and Drug
Administration to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention used existing
delegations of authority, some quite open-ended, to take some of the most crucial
emergency actions throughout the pandemic, such as the initial response to the
rollout of vaccines.96 While the response from these agencies can certainly be
statutes. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 169 (2010) (applying the theory of super-statutory entrenchment to America’s “green
constitution,” which includes various environmental regulatory statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act).
91
Hall, supra note 12, at 178 (“If the Court chooses to adopt a stricter nondelegation test, it could imperil
an estimated three hundred thousand rules that resemble the standard disputed in Gundy.”).
92
Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme Court Wants to Revive a Doctrine that Would Paralyze
Biden’s Administration, SLATE (Dec. 1, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/supremecourt-gundy-doctrine-administrative-state.html; Coan, supra note 15, at 146–47 (“A large fraction of existing
delegations of power . . . could plausibly be said to violate the nondelegation doctrine as Justice Gorsuch
understands it. The uncertainty about which will actually fail his constitutional test is likely to precipitate
considerably more litigation . . . .”).
93
Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1931, 1942–44
(2020) (describing efforts by EPA to adapt the decades-old Clean Air Act to the challenge of climate change
regulation).
94
Peggy Otum & Shannon Morrissey, What a Biden Administration Will Mean for U.S. Climate Change
Policy, WILMERHALE (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20201109-what-abiden-administration-will-mean-for-us-climate-change-policy (“[T]he prospect of a divided Congress makes
significant climate change legislation unlikely. The administration thus will likely be limited to actions that the
executive branch can take alone—including rulemaking and executive orders—to implement its climate
agenda.”).
95
Mark P. Nevitt, The Remaking of the Supreme Court: Implications for Climate Change Litigation and
Regulation, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 114) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717893) (“Future presidential administrations that seek bold agency action on
climate must be particularly careful not to exceed existing delegated authority, and future Congresses must be
mindful of the doctrine when enacting comprehensive climate legislation, whether cap-and-trade, carbon tax, or
some version of the Green New Deal.”).
96
See, e.g., Connor Raso, Emergency Rulemaking in Response to COVID-19, BROOKINGS (Aug. 20,
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criticized,97 it was surely more effective than tasking Congress with the details
of the emergency response at a moment’s notice. As Professor Nicholas Bagley
observes, “[d]elegations of power pervade modern American governance” and
the “reason is simple: Legislatures aren’t equipped to resolve every question for
themselves. Nor are they nimble enough to confront every new challenge as it
arises. Sometimes, they need to draw on the executive branch’s expertise and
dispatch.”98
But this is where Gundy comes in: it is best understood as an effort to
operationalize the nondelegation doctrine in a form that is cabined enough to at
least potentially avoid grinding governance to a halt. It is also hard-edged
enough to meaningfully correct for perceived lapses in the constitutional
framework and the democratic political economy.99 Critics of the Court’s
historically lax approach to the nondelegation doctrine know that drawing lines
in the space between legislative and executive power is difficult,100 but they
consistently insist that the seeds of a judicially manageable approach—one
focused on the importance of the substance of a statute—can be calibrated based
on the Court’s pre-New Deal decisions.101

2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/emergency-rulemaking-in-response-to-covid-19/.
97
See, e.g., Phillip A. Wallach & Justus Myers, The Federal Government’s Coronavirus Response—
Public Health Timeline, BROOKINGS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federalgovernments-coronavirus-actions-and-failures-timeline-and-themes/; Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated
America, THE ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-americanfailure/614191/ (Aug. 4, 2020).
98
Nicholas Bagley, A Warning from Michigan, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/10/america-will-be-michigan-soon/616635/; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989) (noting “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives”).
99
William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine that (Even) Progressives Could Like, 3 AM.
CONST. SOC’Y: S. CT. REV. 211, 237 (2018–2019) (describing the Court in Gundy as pushing “for a revived nondelegation doctrine that promises to do something, but not too much, and to do it in a judicially-manageable
way”).
100
Lawson, supra note 4, at 353 (“The difficulty of drawing this line . . . drives much of the suspicion of
a constitutionally meaningful nondelegation doctrine. Justice Scalia, who in his academic guise toyed with the
idea of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine, reconsidered that position when it required formulating a
concrete, judicially enforceable standard.”).
101
Id. at 376 (“Thus far, all roads have led back to Chief Justice Marshall’s seemingly unsatisfying
formulation for improper delegations. In essence, the formulations examined so far all reduce to the proposition
that Congress must make whatever decisions are sufficiently important to the relevant statutory scheme that
Congress must make them.”); id. at 395 (“The charge that no workable standard for judging delegations can be
formulated is also false. . . . Drawing a line between execution and lawmaking is no harder, and indeed is
probably considerably easier, than drawing a line between reasonable and unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
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D. Gundy and the Future of the Nondelegation Doctrine
The question in Gundy was not particularly hard under the Court’s
nondelegation precedents. At issue was Section 20913(d) of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which delegated authority to the
Attorney General to decide whether the SORNA’s registration provisions would
apply at all to so-called “pre-Act offenders.”102 While this is a sweeping
delegation on its face, Justice Kagan, writing for a plurality of four justices,
made quick work of it, finding that the statute’s declaration of purposes, the
legislative history, and the Court’s own prior interpretation of that provision all
sufficed to support a narrowed construction of the statute’s open-ended
language.103 On this reading, the Attorney General did not have unfettered
discretion to choose, but instead was basically expected to promulgate
regulations to make pre-Act offenders subject to registration requirements.104
Whether the unreconstructed statute would have survived intelligible principle
review is an academic point,105 but given the Court’s precedents, it is difficult to
see how it would have been imperiled. As it is, the reconstructed statute easily
cleared the intelligible principle hurdle.106
In a normal case, that would have been the end of it, but the real action was
in the accompanying opinions. For instance, concurring in the judgment only,
Justice Alito wrote that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider
the approach we have taken for the past [eighty-four] years, I would support that
effort.”107 Count him in the reform column. Most importantly, Justice Gorsuch
dissented and gained the votes of both the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas in
calling for an immediate rejection of the intelligible principle test.108 According
to Justice Gorsuch, the delegation in Section 20913(d) “can only be described as

102

34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123–24 (2019) (“The text, considered alongside its context,
purpose, and history, makes clear that the Attorney General’s discretion extends only to considering and
addressing feasibility issues.”).
104
Id. at 2125 (“On that understanding, the Attorney General’s role under § 20913(d) was important but
limited: It was to apply SORNA to pre-Act offenders as soon as he thought it feasible to do so.”).
105
See id. at 2123 (“The provision, in Gundy’s view, ‘grants the Attorney General plenary power to
determine SORNA’s applicability to pre-Act offenders . . . . If that were so, we would face a nondelegation
question. But it is not.” (citations omitted)).
106
Id. at 2129 (“The question becomes: Did Congress make an impermissible delegation when it instructed
the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible?
Under this Court’s long-established law, that question is easy. Its answer is no.”).
107
Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring).
108
Id. at 2131–48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Alito apparently did not want to join the dissent, despite
his apparent views on nondelegation, because “it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for
special treatment” before a majority chooses to change the approach writ large. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring).
103

WALTERS_2.2.22

438

2/3/2022 10:15 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:417

vast,”109 and the Attorney General’s policy choice “unbounded.”110 But Justice
Gorsuch’s point was not just that this delegation violated the intelligible
principle standard—that would be a hard case to make, given the equally
sweeping delegations upheld by the Court in prior cases.111 Gorsuch also used
the opportunity to argue for a change of standard and an abandonment of the
intelligible principle framework, which he argued had become “mutated” to
mean something different than even Chief Justice Taft intended it to mean, and
“ha[d] been abused to permit delegations of legislative power that on any other
conceivable account should be held unconstitutional.”112 In making this case,
Justice Gorsuch pushed all of the relevant buttons: he argued that permissive
delegation undermined clear lines of accountability among voters, elected
representatives, and public policy;113 he likewise argued that, under our
Constitution, “sovereignty belongs not to a person or institution or class but to
the whole of the people” and that the vesting of legislative power in an institution
ruled out further subdelegation;114 and he tied all of these various strands
together to argue that delegation threatens liberty.115 Indeed, he came close to
stating that the purpose of instituting a heightened standard of review for
delegations is largely to prevent the proliferation of excess laws and

109

Id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2133.
111
See id. at 2129 (majority opinion) (noting that the Court had “approved delegations to various agencies
to regulate in the ‘public interest,’” “sustained authorizations for agencies to set ‘fair and equitable’ prices and
‘just and reasonable’ rates,” and “affirmed a delegation to an agency to issue whatever air quality standards are
‘requisite to protect the public health.’” (citations omitted)).
112
Id. at 2139–40 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
113
Id. at 2134.
114
Id. at 2133 (“Through the Constitution . . . the people had vested the power to prescribe rules limiting
their liberties in Congress alone. No one, not even Congress, had the right to alter that arrangement.”).
115
Id. at 2134 (“Some occasionally complain about Article I’s detailed and arduous processes for new
legislation, but to the framers these were bulwarks of liberty.”). Relatedly, Justice Gorsuch tied this concern to
protection of minority rights against majority tyranny:
110

Because men are not angels and majorities can threaten minority rights, the framers insisted on a
legislature composed of different bodies subject to different electorates as a means of ensuring
that any new law would have to secure the approval of a supermajority of the people’s
representatives. This, in turn, assured minorities that their votes would often decide the fate of
proposed legislation. Indeed, some even thought a Bill of Rights would prove unnecessary in
light of the Constitution’s design; in their view, sound structures forcing “[a]mbition [to] . . .
counteract ambition” would do more than written promises to guard unpopular minorities from
the tyranny of the majority.
Id. (alteration in original).
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regulations,116 precisely because these regulatory restrictions are anathema to
liberty.117
The central contribution of Justice Gorsuch’s analysis, though, is his
articulation of a new test—what some have termed the “Gorsuch test”118—that
purportedly could do the hard work of drawing justiciable lines between
legislative policymaking and execution that would give teeth to the
nondelegation doctrine but not threaten to make governance impossible.119 On
this account, Congress may not delegate any legislative authority unless the
delegation can be fitted into one of three categories of exceptions.120 First,
Justice Gorsuch argued that delegations of legislative authority were proper if
all they did was authorize another branch of government to “fill up the details”
left after Congress announces the “controlling general policy.”121 Stated
somewhat differently, Justice Gorsuch believes that delegation is permissible so
long as Congress “set[s] forth standards ‘sufficiently definite and precise to
enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain’ whether Congress’s
guidance has been followed.”122 Second, Gorsuch argued that “once Congress
prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make the application of
that rule depend on executive fact-finding.”123 As Professor Shalev Roisman has
shown, “presidential factfinding” is actually a central part of the job description,
although it easily bleeds over into “mixed fact and policy powers” and “pure
discretion powers” that theoretically violate Justice Gorsuch’s articulation of
this basis for valid delegation.124 Third and finally, Gorsuch acknowledged that,
in practice, constitutional powers are not hermetically sealed off from one
116
Id. at 2134 (arguing that the “federal government’s most dangerous power was the power to enact laws
restricting the people’s liberty,” that “[a]n ‘excess of law-making’ was . . . one of ‘the diseases to which our
governments are most liable,’” and that “the framers went to great lengths to make lawmaking difficult”).
117
There is a strong presence in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent of what others have termed “libertarian
administrative law”: a presumption in favor of liberty and against government regulation and an understanding
that the very purpose of administrative law is to asymmetrically reinforce that thumb on the scale. For further
discussion, see generally Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 6.
118
Hall, supra note 12, at 201–02.
119
See Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and
Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 177 (2019) (describing Gorsuch’s approach as “more
categorical”); Mike Rappaport, A Nondelegation Doctrine the Court Can Believe In, L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 11,
2020), https://lawliberty.org/a-nondelegation-doctrine-the-court-can-believe-in/ (articulating a version of the
Gorsuch test focused on prohibiting delegation of policymaking discretion and claiming that it is a “judicially
manageable nondelegation doctrine”).
120
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress alone has the power to create
“generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons”).
121
Id. at 2136.
122
Id. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944)).
123
Id.
124
Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 847–52 (2019).

WALTERS_2.2.22

440

2/3/2022 10:15 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:417

another, and so if Congress delegates its power but a coordinate branch has
overlapping power in that domain, the delegation is either illusory or
permissible.125 There seems to be little debate that this articulation of a standard
would be stricter than the intelligible principle standard.126
Subsequent developments with respect to Justice Kavanaugh, along with
Justice Ginsburg’s replacement in Justice Barrett, seem to suggest that the votes
are there for Justice Gorsuch’s approach. Not surprisingly, then, litigants have
begun appealing to the nondelegation doctrine at an historically abnormal clip,
hoping the Court will take the step it has forecasted.127 Interestingly, some of the
most prominent of these cases are being brought on behalf of what would be
considered conventionally liberal or progressive causes. For instance, two such
cases challenged Trump Administration decisions surrounding the border wall
expansion. The first, Center for Biological Diversity v. McAleenan, argued that
Congress’s unrestricted delegation of the power to waive environmental laws
that might apply to the Secretary of Homeland Security violated the
nondelegation doctrine.128 The second, El Paso County v. Trump, similarly
argued that the National Emergencies Act’s delegation of authority to the
President to declare an emergency at the border, and thereby redirect military
funding appropriate for other purposes, was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.129 So far, neither argument has made its way to the Court’s
merits docket: in McAleenan, the Court denied review,130 and in El Paso, the
district court declined to rule on the issue and instead held that the redirection of
funds was prohibited by the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act.131
Separately, Professor Alan Morrison—a progressive litigator who had
previously tried to invigorate the nondelegation doctrine in cases like Bowsher
v. Synar and Mistretta v. United States—petitioned for a writ of certiorari in a
case challenging the Trump Administration’s imposition of tariffs on steel and
aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.132
125

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Hall, supra note 12, at 179 (arguing “the Gorsuch test is stricter than any prior version and, if adopted,
would severely curtail Congress’s ability to give agencies power, thus limiting the administrative state”).
127
Alan B. Morrison, The Supreme Court’s Non-Delegation Tease, YALE J. ON REGUL. (July 29, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-supreme-courts-non-delegation-tease-by-alan-b-morrison/ (discussing two
serious nondelegation challenges presented to the Court in a single year).
128
404 F. Supp. 3d 218, 224 (D.D.C. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 158 (2020).
129
982 F.3d 332, 370 n.8 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
130
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Wolf, No. 19-975 (June 29, 2020) (order list: 591 U.S.).
131
David Bookbinder, The Nondelegation Panic, NISKANEN CTR. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.
niskanencenter.org/the-nondelegation-panic/.
132
Morrison, supra note 127 (referencing Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 806 F. App’x 982
(Fed. Cir. 2020), aff’g 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019)).
126
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Morrison argued that in his case, unlike in Gundy, “the Government did not
dispute our construction of the applicable statute” and that “the Government was
never able to identify a single act that the President could not take regarding
imports that would violate Section 232, including restricting imports of peanut
butter or denying income tax deductions for the 25% tariffs paid.”133
Nevertheless, the Court denied the petition.134
Most recently, Gundy has been cited in cases challenging emergency
measures in the states in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.135 Surprisingly,
some of these challenges were successful, blocking emergency public health
measures and stoking the fears of those who believe that the approach in Gundy
would effectively destroy government capacity to protect the public from harms
that are not addressed through private initiative.136 Although Justice Gorsuch
made a point of arguing that enforcing limits on delegation would not “spell
doom” for regulation and that, even under his test, Congress would be “hardly
bereft of options to accomplish all it might wish to achieve,”137 the COVID-19
emergency orders cases in the states may be viewed by some as a forecast of
what is to come.
These cases, though, like the pandemic that gave rise to them, might be (and
hopefully are) sui generis. And they also point to a potential laboratory for
studying how much doctrinal changes in the nondelegation space matter to
actual outcomes—the states. The next part of this Article uses that laboratory to
cut through the speculation about what Gundy and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
future nondelegation cases might mean for administrative law.
II. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT NONDELEGATION DECISIONS
Perhaps the main reason that the nondelegation doctrine inspires such strong
reactions is because its effects are almost entirely unknown. The lack of
significant variation in outcomes and approaches over time makes it difficult to
discern even basic facts, like whether embracing the test articulated by Justice
Gorsuch in Gundy would actually imperil most federal statutes.138 In this
133

Id.
Id.
135
See, e.g., Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 932 (Wis. 2020) (Kelly, J., concurring); In re
Certified Questions from W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1, 13 (2020).
136
Bagley, supra note 98.
137
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
138
Hall, supra note 12, at 202–06 (attempting to discern the likely effects of the Gorsuch test by applying
it counterfactually in cases decided under the intelligible principle standard). Separate from the question of how
articulations of the nondelegation doctrine would control outcomes, which is the focus in this Article, there are
134
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empirically impoverished environment, it becomes far too easy to characterize
a robust nondelegation doctrine as a panacea or as a bogeyman, as one pleases.
Although it is often overlooked, every state has its own nondelegation
doctrine that applies to state legislation. Unlike at the federal level, there is
substantial variation in terms of approach and outcome. In fact, many states
employ the main features of the Gorsuch test from Gundy, and have been doing
so for a long time, while others adhere to something closer to the intelligible
principle test in permitting the delegation of policymaking discretion. Moreover,
because each state is independent, each state’s application of the nondelegation
doctrine in actual cases varies substantially, both from one another and over
time. The diversity of approaches and outcomes at the state level furnishes an
ideal setting to study what a different articulation of the constitutional limitations
on delegation might mean at the federal level. While states differ on many
dimensions from the federal government,139 the similarities are substantial
enough to make the differences informative, and some of the most innovative
and promising work in the fields of administrative law and public administration
makes use of the analogy to draw lessons for the federal side.140 In that spirit,
this Article turns to an examination of the nondelegation doctrine’s experience
in the states.141 This Article is by no means the first to examine the nondelegation
doctrine in the states,142 although it is, to my knowledge, the first to examine
many other hypothesized effects on Congress’s behavior, most of them anticipating a reinvigoration of
Congress’s work ethic. See Mashaw, supra note 23, at 82 (collecting arguments); Postell, supra note 78, at 283–
90 (collecting arguments). I reserve empirical examination of these questions for separate work. See Walters &
Ash, supra note 27.
139
See infra Part II.D.
140
Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 490–91 (2017) [hereinafter
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration] (arguing “gubernatorial administration deepens our understanding of
executive power” by “provid[ing] a reference point of a stronger and less constrained executive than the modern
presidency to date”); Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1537, 1542
(2019) (arguing that attention to state agency independence can illuminate ambiguities about independence in
the federal context).
141
In focusing on what the state experience foretells about the impending federal nondelegation
experiment, I bracket important normative or prescriptive questions about whether federal and state
nondelegation doctrines should be the same or different, and to what extent they might be calibrated to
complement each other. Cf. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173–90 (2018) (urging a renaissance of state constitutional law development
to allow rights to reflect local preferences); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential
Administration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 265, 271–72 (2019) (theorizing how states could interact with presidential
administration at the federal level); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State
Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859, 902, 905–06 (2021) (noting that states and the federal government may
complement each other in the degree to which they permit majoritarian preferences to shape public policy).
142
See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 31, at 1170–71; Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 381; Postell, supra
note 78, at 281–82; Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 34 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 27, 29 (2018); Randolph J. May, The Nondelegation Doctrine Is Alive and Well in the States,
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empirically how different articulations of the doctrine might affect outcomes in
subsequent nondelegation cases.
This Part proceeds in several subparts. Part II.A begins by classifying states
according to the way that the state’s supreme court formulates the nondelegation
doctrine, showing how many states employ something very close to Justice
Gorsuch’s proposed test from Gundy. Part II.B describes the main data used to
test the hypothesis that the formulation employed by states is associated with
different outcomes. Part II.C presents the main analysis. Part II.D considers a
potential objection to generalizing from the experience in the states to likely
outcomes in federal court. Finally, Part II.E summarizes the empirical findings
and takeaways.
A. Surveying the States: The Varying Formulations of the Nondelegation
Doctrine
As one casebook describes it, “[t]he nondelegation doctrine has much greater
practical significance at the state level than at the federal level.”143 In terms of
raw numbers, this does appear to be the case. Professors Keith Whittington and
Jason Iuliano collected nondelegation decisions in the state courts from the
Founding Era to 2015.144 They found over 2,100 such cases from 1789 to
1940,145 and, sampling at five-year intervals after 1940 up until 2015, they found
919 cases, which extrapolates to over 4,000 cases over the period.146 They also
found a large disparity between the invalidation rate in federal court (three
percent) and the invalidation rate in state court (sixteen percent).147 Contra
claims that the nondelegation doctrine has faded in significance since an
apotheosis in 1935, Whittington and Iuliano conclude that “[t]he narrative of
decline that has dominated the past eighty years is wrong. The nondelegation
doctrine did not die during the New Deal but rather persists to this day,”

REGUL. REV. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/10/15/may-nondelegation-doctrine-alivewell-states/.
143
MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 450 (4th ed.
2014).
144
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 383 (compiling data from cases between 1789 and 1940);
Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
619, 635 (2017) [hereinafter Iuliano & Wittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine] (collecting data from cases
between 1940 and 2015).
145
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 418 (finding 2,506 state and federal cases during this period,
eighty-five percent of which were state decisions).
146
Iuliano & Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 144, at 635–36. I arrive at the number
4,000 by multiplying 919 by 5, which assumes that the sample every five years is stable.
147
Id.
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particularly in state courts; it’s just that it never played a major role in limiting
delegation.148
Although these trends (or the lack thereof) are interesting by themselves
insofar as they suggest that the nondelegation doctrine is not (and has never
been) completely illusory in state courts, as it seemingly has been in federal
courts,149 the aggregate numbers mask much of what is notable about the state
arena. As a growing number of studies have documented, state courts approach
the nondelegation doctrine in unique and variable ways. Legal scholar Gary
Greco provided the first systematic study of state nondelegation doctrine,
grouping states into one of three categories: 1) “strict” nondelegation states, in
which courts require the state legislature to “provide definite and clear standards
with the delegation”;150 2) “loose” nondelegation states, in which courts require
only that a statute “contains a general rule to guide the agency in exercising the
delegated power”;151 and 3) “procedural safeguards” states, in which the courts
eschew analysis of the standards laid down by the legislature in favor of an
analysis of the adequacy of the procedures to constrain the exercise of
discretion.152 According to Greco, the “loose” nondelegation doctrine
predominated in the states.153 The consideration of adequate procedural
safeguards—procedural
requirements,
internal
norms,
self-limiting
interpretations of statutes, and the like—as a cure for broad delegation, while
fairly common in the states,154 is almost entirely absent in the federal cases.155
148
Id. at 645. Others have pushed back on this claim, arguing that in the pre-New Deal Era, the
nondelegation doctrine, as applied to delegations to executive branch agencies, was widely understood to be,
and in fact was, more robust than Whittington and Iuliano suggest. See Postell, supra note 78, at 303–04.
149
See Iuliano & Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 144 (making this point and
focusing much effort on identifying variation in challenges and outcomes based on the type of delegation
involved).
150
Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 567, 579–80 (1994).
151
Id. at 588.
152
Id. at 598.
153
Id. at 575.
154
See Rossi, supra note 31, at 1191–93 (finding six states explicitly adopted the procedural safeguards
approach). The procedural safeguards approach can be sourced to administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp
Davis, who argued that the attempt to define the nondelegation doctrine by reference to the specificity of
legislation had failed and that the courts should shift their focus to encouraging agencies to self-limit their
discretion. See Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp Davis, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
315, 332 (2005).
155
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has apparently definitively ruled out this approach. See Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (holding that “[t]he idea that an agency can cure an
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us
internally contradictory” because “[w]hether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts,
and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer”). But see Merrill, supra note 86, at 1957,
1960–61 (understanding the general nonenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine as a “grand synthesis”
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Building on Greco’s work, Professor Jim Rossi classified states into weak,
moderate, and strong categories. Similar to Greco, Rossi found that a plurality
of states employs a moderate version of the nondelegation doctrine, although
states with a strong doctrine (twenty of the fifty states) were not far behind.156
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy provides a new opportunity to assess
where states stand. With the aid of a research assistant, I examined statements
from state supreme court cases involving nondelegation challenges to classify
states’ nondelegation doctrines according to Gorsuch’s conceptualization of the
inquiry. Specifically, I attempted to discern whether any states (a) borrow the
language “fill up the details”157 or some equivalent attempt to prohibit the
delegation of policymaking authority in the drafting of rules; (b) specify that
executive agencies can identify whether facts are present that would trigger a
policy set by the legislature; or (c) recognize that delegation may be saved by
the fact that the executive branch inherently shares overlapping power in that
domain.158 I also tracked whether states recognized a consideration of procedural
safeguards to be relevant to the nondelegation inquiry. Table 1 compares my
classifications with those of Greco and Rossi.
For my purposes, the most important observation is that twenty-two states
appear to fully adopt something close to Justice Gorsuch’s “fill up the details”
standard,159 with twenty-eight states retaining something that more generally
resembles the intelligible principle standard in only requiring a high-level
involving the partial substitution of process for positive law).
156
Rossi, supra note 31, at 1193–201.
157
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
158
These, again, map to the three prongs of the Gorsuch test. See Hall, supra note 12, at 201–02.
159
To take one example, and one where the state had been previously classified by Rossi and Greco as a
“weak” or “procedural safeguards” state, Iowa adheres substantially to the Gorsuch test. See, e.g., Wall v. Cnty.
Bd. of Educ. of Johnson Cnty., 249 Iowa 209, 228 (1957) (“Authority as to details and promulgation of rules
and regulations to carry out legislative directions and policies may be delegated.”). The focus on legislative rules
and policies and administrative details tracks the first prong of the Gorsuch test closely. Iowa has rearticulated
the rule over the years but still retains a focus on “clear delineation of legislative policy and substantive standards
to guide the agency in its implementation of that policy.” In re C.S., 516 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Iowa 1994). Another
state that quite clearly uses the Gorsuch verbiage is Kansas. See, e.g., Kan. One-Call Sys., Inc. v. State, 274 P.3d
625, 634 (Kan. 2012) (requiring consideration of the “specific standards set out in the [legislature’s] delegation”
to distinguish whether it “has delegated legislative power or administrative power,” and permitting the legislature
to “delegate to administrative bodies discretion to ‘fill in the details,’ provided there are definite standards to
guide the exercise of authority”); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 955 P.2d 1136,
1148 (Kan. 1998) (“In other words, the legislature may enact general provisions and delegate to an administrative
body the discretion to ‘fill in the details’ if the legislature establishes ‘reasonable and definite standards to govern
the exercise of such authority.’”); Consumers’ Sand Co. v. Exec. Council of State of Kan., 268 P. 123, 126 (Kan.
1928) (“[A] statute which vests discretion in an administrative body or public officer, conferring arbitrary power
to regulate the conduct of a lawful business or the lawful use of private property, without prescribing a rule of
action for the guidance of such board or officer, is unconstitutional and void.”).
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statement of the goals or policy of the statute.160 Less common is recognition of
the second exception articulated by Justice Gorsuch: only nine states seem to
recognize that contingent legislation—that is, legislation that is triggered by a
finding of fact by an executive official—can be consistent with the principle of
nondelegation.161 Only one state—Missouri—recognized Justice Gorsuch’s
nebulous third category.162 Overall, Justice Gorsuch’s approach is not foreign to
the states.

160
For instance, Kentucky, despite being classified by Rossi and Greco as having a “strong” or “strict”
nondelegation doctrine, follows the intelligible principle standard, citing it by name. See, e.g., Brewer v.
Commonwealth, 478 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Ky. 2015) (“Practicality recognizes that the General Assembly cannot
accomplish all its duties without help. Similar to the federal ‘intelligible principle’ rule, the General Assembly
may delegate its authority in those limited circumstances where it ‘lay[s] down policies and establish[es]
standards’ to which the body directed to act must conform.”). The same is true of Ohio. See, e.g., Blue Cross of
Ne. Ohio v. Ratchford, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ohio 1980) (“We hold that a statute does not unconstitutionally
delegate legislative power if it establishes, through legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an
intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform and further establishes a
procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effectively.”). Arkansas also exemplifies the
general guidelines or intelligible principle approach, although it does not use the federal language. The Arkansas
Court “has held that discretionary power may be delegated by the legislature to a state agency as long as
reasonable guidelines are provided.” Bakalekos v. Furlow, 410 S.W.3d 564, 571 (Ark. 2011) (“This guidance
must include appropriate standards by which the administrative body is to exercise this power.”).
161
See, e.g., State v. Ariz. Mines Supply Co., 484 P.2d 619, 625 (Ariz. 1971) (“[T]he decisions display an
increasing tendency, due to the complexity of our social and industrial activities, to hold as nonlegislative the
authority conferred upon commissions and boards to formulate rules and regulations and to determine the state
of facts upon which the law intends to make its action depend.”); Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,
90 N.E.3d 1171, 1186 (Ind. 2018) (“First, ‘the legislature cannot delegate the power to make a law.’ It can only
‘make a law delegating power to an agency to determine the existence of some fact or situation upon which the
law is intended to operate.’” (citations omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Gunderson v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 1167
(2019).
162
State v. Cushman, 451 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Mo. 1970) (“[T]he General Assembly, having established a
sufficiently definite policy, may authorize an administrative officer to make rules, regulations or orders relating
to the administration of enforcement of the law. In other words, administrative power, as distinguished from
legislative power, constitutionally may be delegated by the General Assembly.”).

WALTERS_2.2.22

2022]

2/3/2022 10:15 AM

DECODING NONDELEGATION AFTER GUNDY

Table 1: Classifications of State Nondelegation Doctrines

447

WALTERS_2.2.22

448

2/3/2022 10:15 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:417

As Table 1 shows, my own classifications of states’ nondelegation doctrines
under the Gorsuch test yields some notable changes in the general tenor of the
review in a handful of states. This is to be expected: I am focused on features of
the standards that are now more clearly relevant in the aftermath of Gundy than
they were when Greco and Rossi compiled their lists. In addition, coding states
involves judgment calls where the language used by the court is ambiguous or
does not fit perfectly, and that was the case even with Greco’s and Rossi’s
studies.163 I have attempted to review a selection of cases and find a statement
of the state’s nondelegation doctrine that is fairly complete and explicit. It is no
doubt possible to find individual cases that seem not to fit the classification, but
the tradeoff of some detail allows for more systematic quantitative analysis of
general trends and impacts.
My review of the cases also uncovered another dividing line between states’
approaches to the nondelegation doctrine. Most states frame the inquiry around
discerning whether a standard of some kind has been delineated by the state
legislature, and the question is simply whether that inquiry demands very little
be left over for agencies or permits the exercise of discretion so long as a general
standard exists to guide that discretion. But some states explicitly use what
amounts to a sliding scale approach wherein the need for specificity in the
statutory delegation varies as the context of the delegation varies.164 For
instance, in Alaska, statutes governing technical or narrow matters can delegate
broad discretion to agencies, but when more fundamental policy questions are
at issue, more specificity is required.165 While this kind of thinking is not entirely
unheard of in the federal cases166 and is implicit in “major questions” thinking
in general167 and some models of the nondelegation problem,168 it has never been

163

See Greco, supra note 150, at 579 n.66 (“Obviously the categories will have some overlap . . . .”).
See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 814 S.E.2d 54, 64 (N.C. 2018).
165
State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Alaska 1987).
166
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“It is true enough that the degree of
agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”).
167
See generally Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J.
ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 479, 480 (2016) (arguing that under the major questions doctrine “a court will not defer to
an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision in circumstances where the case involves an issue of deep
economic or political significance”); Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The
Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 358 (2016) (arguing the major questions
doctrine “says that when the legal stakes are sufficiently high, agency interpretations of law carry little or no
weight, contrary to the standard rule in everyday cases where those interpretations are often determinative”). It
also may be implicit in the way the Court has operationalized the intelligible principle standard. See Sullivan,
supra note 89, at 1234 (articulating a theory of the intelligible principle standard based on a sliding scale where
the degree of specificity required varies based on whether Congress has the ability to ensure agencies will act in
the way contemplated by the delegation).
168
See Coglianese, supra note 63, at 1876 fig.1 (depicting how federal nondelegation doctrine only
164
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so explicitly incorporated into the doctrine as it is in several states. That said,
states that incorporate a sliding scale element do not uniformly focus on the same
contextual factors as indicating less need for specificity. For instance, in
Delaware, a statute that focuses on “public morals, health, safety or general
welfare” is given “more latitude”—essentially the opposite of the major
questions doctrine, as traditionally conceived.169 Overall, this more fluid
understanding of the reach of the nondelegation doctrine is an interesting twist
on the federal arena, where such attempts to tailor the doctrine to context have
yielded to a static “intelligible principle” standard.170 This may be explained by
the states’ greater need for limits on the justiciability of nondelegation
challenges, given that many recognize a more robust nondelegation doctrine
than exists at the federal level. In the analysis that follows, I draw on each of
these classificatory schemes on the theory that, among them, the measures
capture something real about the flavor of review in various states.
B. An Overview of the State Nondelegation Case Dataset
As discussed above, the main question I seek to answer is whether the
variation among states’ approaches to the nondelegation doctrine can explain the
variation in outcomes. In essence, I ask whether employing a relatively “strict”
doctrine corresponds to higher rates of invalidations of statutes. To answer that
question, it is necessary to collect data on nondelegation cases. Although
Professors Whittington and Iuliano collected a complete dataset for the period
from 1789 to 1940,171 their more recent data only covers cases sampled every
fifth year.172 Seeking a more complete sample, especially for more recent
decades, I set out to collect every state supreme court case involving a challenge
to a delegation of legislative authority to the Executive Branch, including
delegations to the governor’s office itself or to executive agencies.173 To do so,
I used the Westlaw key system to identify the universe of potentially relevant

prohibits delegation when there is a high amount of both discretion and power).
169
Lamberty v. State, No. 232, 2014, 2015 WL 428581, at *3 (Del. Jan. 30, 2015) (quoting Raley v. State,
No. 95,1991, 1991 WL 235357, at *2 (Del. Sept. 16, 1991)).
170
See infra Part I.B (discussing the Court’s endorsement of the intelligible principle standard and
reviewing the almost uniformly deferential results it has yielded).
171
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 418.
172
Iuliano & Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 144, at 635.
173
I sought to exclude cases involving delegations of authority to municipalities, courts, and private
individuals or entities. While these are important categories of nondelegation cases, particularly in the states, I
am most interested in what can be gleaned from state cases for the application of the federal nondelegation
doctrine, and most federal nondelegation cases involve delegations of legislative authority to the executive
branch.
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cases.174 To ensure that I was not missing relevant cases, I cast a wide net.175
This search returned 4,001 cases ranging from 1830 to 2019.176 Not all of these
cases were true nondelegation challenges, though. It is fairly common for courts
to make note of nondelegation principles as general background, even in cases
where the court did not resolve the case on nondelegation grounds.177 Even after
reducing the pool of included cases to those where two coders agreed the case
should be included, it is apparent that many states regularly hear at least one or
two nondelegation cases every year, as Figure 1 demonstrates.

174
Westlaw’s key system may in some sense be both “overinclusive and underinclusive.” David Zaring,
Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 708, 739 n.189 (2020). I have attempted to
minimize overinclusiveness by having research assistants read opinions to determine whether nondelegation was
actually at issue. Underinclusiveness is less addressable, but there is no better way to identify relevant cases. See
id. at 739 (noting that, although there are “some limitations” to Westlaw searches, “it is unlikely to miss any
separation of powers case purporting to overrule” a statute—i.e., the most important cases).
175
While key numbers 92k2405 through 92k2432 purport to focus on the cases of interest—delegations
of legislative power to the executive branch—I collected cases from the broader set of keys concerning
legislative power, including delegations to other actors, such as courts, on the theory that some of these cases
might still present issues of delegation to the executive as well. A research assistant thus compiled the full set of
cases returned under the following keys: “XX. Separation of Powers. (B) Legislative Powers and Functions. 4.
Delegation of Powers, k2400-2449.”
176
The search was conducted in early 2020 and, rather than have an incomplete population of cases for
2020, I elected to confine the search to December 31, 2019 or earlier. The number of “hits” returned by the
search was significantly higher than 4,001 cases, but this was because a single case could appear under several
different headnote keys. A first step in processing the data was thus to eliminate duplicate cases.
177
For my purposes, I treated statutory interpretation cases, in which the court appeared to adopt a narrow
construction of a statute to avoid nondelegation problems, as true nondelegation cases. This accords with the
scholarly literature’s emphasis on interpretive canons as doing some work that the nondelegation doctrine might
otherwise do. See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 316 (“[C]ertain canons of construction operate as nondelegation
principles.”); Manning, supra note 74, at 223 (“The nondelegation doctrine, in other words, now operates
exclusively through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional questions.”).
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Figure 1: Case Counts by State and Year

Likewise, some cases did not concern delegation of legislative authority to
executive branch actors, but instead concerned delegation to courts or other
actors. To cull only cases where there was presentation and resolution of the
kind of nondelegation challenge that is typically at issue in the federal system,
it was necessary to read each case and determine whether the case should be
included. I assigned two research assistants to read each case and code whether
the case should be included, as well as whether the statute was invalidated. Using
the independent determinations by these coders allows for analysis of more
conservative and more inclusive datasets of cases: for instance, the most
conservative list of cases involves those where both coders agreed that the case
should be included, while a more inclusive (but potentially overinclusive) list
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involves those where at least one coder thought the case should be included. I
do not analyze cases where both coders agreed the case should not be included,
and I only present results from the cases where both coders agreed the case
should be included. The results are generally comparable using the entire set of
cases where at least one coder thought the case should be included. Notably, the
coders achieved perfect agreement on the outcome variable—usually courts are
quite clear when they invalidate a statute or adopt a limiting construction to
avoid a constitutional infirmity.
C. Analysis of the State Cases
I now turn to the main empirical analysis, starting with a descriptive
overview of the dataset before moving to an analysis of the relationship between
doctrinal standards and outcomes.
1. Trends Over Time
A starting point for the analysis is describing the general trends in the data.
Figure 2 presents a smoothed average across all states of the cumulative
percentage of cases resulting in validation of the statute. When the line is going
down over time, that indicates that the courts are invalidating more statutes than
they are validating; a line moving up means that courts are validating more
statutes than they are invalidating. When the line is flat, as it essentially has been
since roughly 1950, that means that the courts are, on average, stable.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Percent Validated Across All States

The trends displayed in Figure 2 are informative on several levels. First, on
the whole, the validation rate of 81.3% is noticeably more stringent in practice
than the federal nondelegation doctrine. These findings are consistent with prior
studies, which estimate an invalidation rate in the high teens. Second, with recent
history excepted, the apparent stringency of the nondelegation doctrine in the
states has been quite volatile. The earliest cases were, overall, fairly close to the
modern average validation rate, albeit with a greater variance in outcomes across
states. Then, in the mid- to late-1800s, the courts began a drastic tightening of
their approach, driving the average validation rate down to around 60% of cases.
Courts again changed their approach around the turn of the twentieth century,
driving the average validation rate to almost 90% by the 1920s. The courts then
leveled off over the New Deal years, settling at an 83.1% validation rate for the
period running from 1950 to 2019. These findings largely correspond to previous
findings,178 but not entirely. There is clearly more volatility in the validation rate
than previous research has shown.179
This volatility has yet another dimension: individual states have had wildly
different experiences over time, often deviating substantially from the national
average. Figure 3 shows the same basic statistic—the cumulative rate of
178
See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 38, at 419–20 (finding that “[n]ondelegation cases surged at the
opening of the twentieth century,” but “the number of judicial invalidations hardly budged”).
179
See Iuliano & Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 144, at 633 (finding that “the
success rate has remained markedly stable over the past century”).
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validation—but breaks it out by state. Compared to Figure 2, several states show
distinctive changes in the validation rate over time. A common pattern,
exemplified by New Hampshire, North Carolina, and New Jersey, among others,
is a “V-shape” trend: these states start with a high or even perfect validation rate,
abruptly tighten their review, and then almost as abruptly revert to a higher level
of deference. Another common pattern, exemplified by California, Kentucky,
and Pennsylvania, is a somewhat gradual but consistent slide from extremely
low validation rates to generally higher rates. Previous studies of state
nondelegation decisions focused on the aggregate level, missing the stark
variation in the way the nondelegation doctrine has been deployed by particular
states at particular times. Overall, Figure 3 suggests a high degree of malleability
in the application of the doctrine: indeed, the doctrinal articulation of the
nondelegation principle generally does not change fundamentally within states
but the revealed stringency of the doctrine clearly does. On its face, this
malleability in application highlights concerns that the nondelegation doctrine is
not mechanical enough to provide a predictable baseline against which to
legislate, and that the doctrine is driven by extra-legal considerations, like
politics.
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2. Analyzing Doctrinal Constraint
The question the data inevitably raises is whether doctrinal differences
across states explain a meaningful portion of this variation. Do the states that
use a test closer to Justice Gorsuch’s test in Gundy invalidate statutes at a higher
rate? And, if so, how much higher?
Table 2 presents the simplest test of the hypothesis that doctrine matters for
outcomes. Cross-tabulations reveal that there is no obvious difference in the
frequency of invalidation across states employing different forms of the
nondelegation doctrine. Chi-square tests confirm that the differences that do
exist do not rise to the level of statistical significance. That is, we cannot
distinguish these differences from random variation. The closest any doctrinal
formulation comes to statistical significance is the second prong of the Gorsuch
test—that is, the principle that executive actors may be permitted to make factual
findings that trigger a policy determination that the state legislature has already
made. For states that did not recognize this aspect of the Gorsuch test, the
validation rate was 86.2%, and for states that did recognize it, the validation rate
was 83.3%, a difference that could well be random (p=.207).
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Table 2: Cross-Tabulations of Outcomes by Doctrine
Validate

Invalidate

Chi-Square

p-value

268
497
609

55
104
135

0.26

.878

231
617
476

49
137
96

0.43

.805

783
591

166
128

0.27

.869

1184
190

245
49

1.59

.207

1348
26

289
5

0.05

.825

940
434

194
100

0.66

.418

Rossi
Weak
Moderate
Strong
Greco
Procedural Safeguards
Loose
Strict
Gorsuch Test
Fill in Details
No
Yes
Executive Factfinding
No
Yes
Overlap with
Executive
No
Yes
Procedural
Safeguards
No
Yes

This simple analysis cannot account for a variety of factors that might
plausibly affect outcomes. Perhaps after these factors are accounted for, the
variation across doctrinal formulations will matter more. To that end, I turn to a
multivariate regression analysis of individual decisions.
Several factors could plausibly lead a state with a more stringent or less
stringent doctrinal formulation of the nondelegation doctrine to make different
decisions than the doctrine might suggest. For instance, certain delegations
regarding special topics might be especially likely to draw or evade scrutiny.
Nondelegation cases involving criminal justice are widely suspected to be
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treated with relative skepticism because of their extreme impacts on individual
liberty,180 and some courts say as much.181 Cases involving delegations
concerning local matters, taxes, and public utilities, by contrast, might be more
likely to be given a relatively light version of review, given that they raise
complicated questions about federalism, government funding, and technical
matters that courts may wish to avoid. In addition, the prior propensity of a state
legislature to delegate, as well as the court’s own history of review, might shape
individual decisions. Additionally, as others have noted, the degree to which
states institutionalize or codify the separation of powers can vary,182 which may
affect the operation of the nondelegation doctrine—perhaps by taking away
some of the perceived need for enforceable judicial limits on the delegation
decision. Finally, as Figure 2 demonstrated, state courts have, in the aggregate,
changed direction at various points in time. These periodic changes might drive
individual decisions as much as doctrine, as courts adjust their approach to
conform to their peer courts in other states.
I control for these potentially confounding factors by estimating multivariate
logistic regressions predicting the outcome in individual cases—validate (0) or
invalidate (1). A positive coefficient estimate indicates that a variable increases
the probability that a case would result in invalidation of a statute under the
nondelegation doctrine; a negative coefficient indicates the opposite. The main
predictor variables are, as in Table 1, doctrinal. Specifically, Figure 4 focuses
on whether the state recognizes any of the prongs of the Gorsuch test, as well as
whether the state recognizes that procedural safeguards can suffice to validate a
delegation of legislative power. To these predictors I add variables
corresponding to each of the categories above. For the special topic category, I
include simple indicator variables noting that the case was coded by research
assistants as involving special topics—criminal matters, local matters, tax
matters, or public utilities matters—which could lead to a lower or higher chance
of invalidation. For the delegation history category, I include a battery of textual

180
See, e.g., Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 817 (2019) (noting Justice
Gorsuch has indicated that a stricter nondelegation rule could apply in criminal law); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal
Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 115 n.367 (2008) (explaining
that delegation under a federal law establishing national sex offender registry has a “unique normative
importance affecting the liberty of individual citizens”); Jenny Roberts, Gundy and the Civil-Criminal Divide,
17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 209 (2019) (“[O]ne choice the Court may confront is whether it should treat
delegation in the criminal law context differently from delegation in the civil law context.”).
181
See, e.g., People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 410 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (“In the context of a criminal
statute, the nondelegation doctrine requires a closer examination of the legislature’s actions.”).
182
Rossi, supra note 31, at 1190–91 (outlining “three basic approaches” to state codification of the
separation of powers doctrine).
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measures of delegation from state session laws183 and measures capturing the
degree to which that court had intervened to review and stop delegations in the
past.184 Specifically, delegation current year measures the total number of
delegations to the executive branch in a particular state’s session laws in the
calendar year that the case was decided;185 delegations last 10 years computes a
moving average of the total number of delegations in that state over the past ten
years; cumulative delegations captures the extent of accumulated delegations by
measuring the total number of delegations in a particular state by the year in
which the case was decided; cumulative cases measures the total number of
nondelegation cases, as measured by my nondelegation cases dataset, in a
particular state up to the year in which the case was decided; and, finally,
cumulative share validated measures the percent of nondelegation cases to date
resulting in validation of a statute. In the structural features category, I draw
upon existing scholarship to capture important institutional design features in
particular states: executive review is an indicator for whether a particular state in
a particular year had some form of gubernatorial review of regulations, as
documented by Miriam Seifter in her work on gubernatorial administration;186
line item veto likewise indicates whether a particular state in a particular year
had some form of gubernatorial line item veto, again drawing on Seifter’s
work;187 and finally, relying on Jim Rossi’s tabulation of state constitutional
provisions concerning the separation of powers (abbreviated “SOP” for
convenience),188 I include a factor variable for whether a particular state had no
SOP clause, a weak SOP clause, or a strict SOP clause (the weak SOP clause
category serves as the reference point in the estimation). The final category of
controls comprises a single factor variable indicating in which of four periods
the case was decided. These periods were drawn from the basic changepoints
indicated in Figure 2: pre-1900 indicates the fairly volatile period before the year
1900, progressive indicates the period running from 1900–1934, new deal
indicates the period running from 1935–1949, and modern indicates the period

183
Matia Vannoni, Elliot Ash & Massimo Morelli, Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative
Texts: Methods and Applications to US States, 29 POL. ANALYSIS 43, 46–47 (2020) (developing contextsensitive computational linguistic measures of delegation in a complete corpus of state session laws).
184
I simply calculate the cumulative percentage of cases resulting in validation of a statute on a yearly
basis. The percentage in any given year represents the record to date in nondelegation challenges in the court
hearing the case.
185
See Vannoni et al., supra note 183, at 46–47.
186
Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration: Appendices, at app.A (Univ. Wis. Legal Stud. Rsch.
Paper Series, Paper No. 1407, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2934671.
187
Id. at app.C.
188
Rossi, supra note 31, at 1201 tbl.1.
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running from 1950–2019 (here, the reference point in the estimation is the
modern period).189
The results of four separate models are reported in Figure 4. The first model
includes the main predictor variables measuring doctrinal features of a state’s
approach to the nondelegation doctrine and adds the special topics variables
(darkest gray); the second model repeats the first but adds the delegation history
variables (second darkest gray); the third model repeats the second but adds the
structural features variables (second lightest gray); and the fourth model includes
all variables, including the controls for the period (lightest gray). The dot shows
the point estimate, while the whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. A
point estimate whose whisker falls to the left or the right of the dashed vertical
line is statistically significant.

189
The indicators for historical period perform similar to the role of fixed effects for temporal variation
common to all states. Actual fixed effects at the year level reveal similar results, but I do not display them here
because the application I used to produce dot and whisker plots does not support the application I used to estimate
fixed effects logistic regressions.
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Figure 4: Logistic Regression Models of the Decision to Invalidate a State
Statute in a Nondelegation Challenge
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None of the models should change the interpretation of the results from
Table 1. Accounting for other factors, the doctrinal formulation existing in a
state is not a meaningful predictor of case outcomes in individual cases. At the
same time, a handful of the control variable outcomes are statistically
significant, or at least very nearly statistically significant, which provides some
insight into what might be driving decisions. For instance, delegation current
year is associated with a lower probability of invalidation, as is cumulative share
validated. By contrast, the moving average of total delegations over the ten years
leading up to the decision is very nearly statistically significant across three
model specifications and appears to be associated with a greater chance of
invalidation. Together, these variables suggest that, even accounting for static
doctrine, courts adjust their behavior to the environment for delegation in which
they operate. Not surprisingly, given the volatility indicated in Figure 2, relative
to the modern era’s 16.9% invalidation rate, courts were less likely to invalidate
statutes during the progressive era (and more likely to invalidate statutes in the
new deal era, at least at the p<0.1 level).
The results in Figure 4, and really any models based on observational data
and simple regression, are susceptible to questions about equilibrium effects. If
litigants make strategic decisions about whether to bring cases based on the
strength of their case under current doctrine, it is possible that, over time, the
composition of cases will change based on the current doctrine, leading the
probability of invalidation to remain the same even with a doctrine that is
meaningfully more or less stringent than another jurisdiction’s.190 The same
might be said about legislative behavior: assuming that the legislature pays close
attention to the state supreme court’s nondelegation decisions, any adjustment
might induce a change in statutory drafting that would make nondelegation
doctrine challenges more or less likely to succeed.191 A not dissimilar problem
arose in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly192 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,193 which imposed heightened “plausibility”
pleading requirements in general civil litigation, where empirical legal scholars
190
This is essentially the “Priest-Klein” model of dispute resolution, which posits that rational and
strategic decisions about whether to elevate a dispute to full-on litigation leads to coin-flip odds in the court’s
final decision. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 4 (1984). For a more recent review of the literature and critique of the Priest-Klein model, see Yoon-Ho Alex
Lee & Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hypotheses: Proofs and Generality, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 59,
70 (2016).
191
The parallel research I am conducting on legislative responses to the nondelegation doctrine shows that
this effect may exist, but it is likely quite small—at most, leading to about a five percent change in delegations
across the board. See Walters & Ash, supra note 27.
192
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
193
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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attempted to test the hypothesis that the heightened pleading standard
disadvantaged plaintiffs in subsequent cases.194 While this problem is difficult
to resolve completely, there are reasons to believe it is not as serious a problem
as it was in the pleading context.
When it comes to primary legislative behavior, research suggests that
statutory drafters are highly inattentive to the details of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions. Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman extensively surveyed
legislative staffers who draft the bulk of statutes and found that major
administrative law doctrines are “not getting through to Congress,” as evidenced
by drafters’ general unfamiliarity with all but the well-known Chevron rule.195
Even when the signal gets through, Congress frequently ignores the Court’s
pronouncements, as it has in continuing to include one-house legislative veto
provisions in legislation even after the Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.196 It
is therefore not obvious at all that primary legislative behavior would change
much based on the stringency of the doctrine. In general, the existing research
in the nondelegation context suggests that the effect is either nonexistent197 or
substantively small.198
Similarly, while individual litigants often have incentives to assess the
probability of success, those incentives may well be attenuated in this context—
it is otherwise difficult to understand why, despite a vanishingly small
probability of success in federal courts over more than 200 years, litigants
continue to bring cases. Indeed, nondelegation cases are often brought not by
individual claimants, but by, or with the support of, institutional repeat players
who have incentives delinked from the immediate probability of success.199
194
See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal
on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2276 (2012) (“[T]he existing empirical literature cannot settle
disagreements over the effects of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal.”).
195
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013).
196
See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273
(1993) (“In response to Chadha, Congress eliminated the legislative veto from a number of statutes. The
legislative veto continues to thrive, however, as a practical accommodation between executive agencies and
congressional committees. More than two hundred new legislative vetoes have been enacted since Chadha.”
(referencing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983))).
197
Stiglitz, supra note 142, at 30 (“[T]he presence or absence of a strong nondelegation doctrine appears
essentially unrelated to the drafting practices in state legislatures.”).
198
See supra note 27. In addition, some of the controls in Figure 4, supra, address the possibility of
changing legislative behavior. Specifically, both the average number of delegations over the past ten years and
the number of delegations in the year the case was decided capture changes in the baseline.
199
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–100 (1974) (noting “repeat players”—litigants with long-term incentives or needs to use
the litigation system—can withstand losses strategically in advancing long-term interests incrementally).
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These kinds of actors are interested in a change in the law, which by definition
requires discounting, at least to some extent, the actual probability of success
(though of course the litigant always has an incentive to present the best possible
case). Moreover, the Priest-Klein model has had little predictive success in the
appellate courts, where the costs of litigation are relatively low.200 For all these
reasons, it is likely that even strategic litigants will not change their propensity
to litigate nondelegation claims based on a perception of how stringent the
doctrine is.
However, it is possible to use the data to address the concern that even
residual strategic considerations might change the equilibrium enough to
influence the results in Figure 4. Case counts may be more revealing than
individual probabilities of success in a given case because, assuming strategic
litigation occurs in the context of stable legislative behavior, weak regimes
should encourage less litigation (and less successful litigation, in particular) than
in strong regimes. Figure 5 thus presents two robustness checks modeling case
counts instead of individual probabilities of success in a case.201 Figure 5(A)
models the number of invalidations of statutes observed in a given state in a
given year, while Figure 5(B) models the total number of cases presenting a
nondelegation challenge, regardless of outcome.

200
Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal
Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2011).
201
Except for the changed outcome variable, I use much the same setup for these models as before,
including many of the same covariates. Instead of indicators for the historical period, I can display the results of
linear models with fixed effects at the year level. In addition, I drop the cumulative cases variable from the
predictor variables in Figure 5(B) because it serves as the substitute outcome variable.
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Figure 5: Count Models of Nondelegation Cases

The results in Figure 5(A) are the more direct robustness check of the results
in Figure 4, and the results are quite similar. None of the doctrinal classification
variables indicates any relationship with the volume of invalidations under the
nondelegation doctrine. In other words, total invalidations are consistent across
states, even after controlling for the total volume of delegations and the total
volume of cases. These findings are more striking in light of the results in Figure
5(B), which indicate that litigants are induced to bring more nondelegation
challenges by a variety of factors but not by the presence of key features of the
Gorsuch test. In fact, the presence of the fill in the details formulation is not
associated with any change in the propensity to litigate (and we would expect
more cases), and the states that emphasize Justice Gorsuch’s focus on executive
factfinding actually experience significantly lower volumes of nondelegation
litigation—a finding which, again, survives the addition of controls. Two of the
other doctrinal variables are worth noting in this specification as well: First, the
overlap with executive variable is significant in the first model, but the addition
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of controls eliminates this association. Second, the procedural safeguards
approach, which is widely viewed as the most delegation-friendly formulation
of the doctrine, is statistically significantly associated with increased litigation
in the first model, but it too fades in significance when controls are added. If it
is true that weaker regimes discourage litigation and stronger regimes encourage
litigation, all else equal, then the results in Figure 5 suggest that key features of
the Gorsuch test are either weak features or, at the very least, no different than
other formulations, such as the intelligible principle approach or the procedural
safeguards approach.
One final point bears mentioning. As political scientists have long
understood, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions can be explained, at least in
part, by the ideological preferences of the justices.202 One might wonder if the
findings above fail to account for the possibility that the courts might not always
prefer, on a purely ideological level, to invalidate statutes. It may be the case,
for instance, that left-leaning justices prefer not to use the nondelegation doctrine
to invalidate legislation because they generally support regulation, while rightleaning justices are more open to the nondelegation doctrine because they
oppose regulation. If a state supreme court is relatively liberal, then perhaps it
would not be likely to use even the Gorsuch test to invalidate statutes, and vice
versa. To test this possibility, I added a control to the models reported above that
captures the median ideology of the state supreme court at the time of the
decision.203 Neither a court’s ideology alone nor the interaction between the
court’s ideology and the ideology of the other branches of government resulted
in any statistically significant relationship with outcomes, and the inclusion of
these variables does not change the results reported above. Although a full
exploration of the role of ideology in nondelegation decisions at the state level
is beyond the scope of this Article, the data casts doubt on the idea that the
current U.S. Supreme Court’s strong conservatism would somehow override the
findings above and lead the Court to deploy the Gorsuch test more aggressively
than the states have.204 Even when state supreme courts are relatively
202
See, e.g., TOM S. CLARK, THE SUPREME COURT: AN ANALYTIC HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION MAKING 20 (2019) (“[E]mpirical scholarship has often argued that a simple unidimensional model of
judicial preferences is sufficient to understand most meaningful variation in judges’ voting patterns—or, at least,
the votes of the justices on the US Supreme Court.”).
203
The median ideology scores are computed using common-space data from Adam Bonica & Michael J.
Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of State Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 472, 488 (2015).
These scores are available only for a subset of time covered in the nondelegation case dataset—namely, 1990
through 2012—so the analysis discussed above only applies to those years. Id.
204
It is somewhat reassuring to find some evidence that the ideology of courts does not appear to be a
predictor of outcomes in nondelegation cases, as that suggests that perhaps the doctrine will not become
completely politicized. But it is important to keep in mind that this is a preliminary test and more detailed analysis
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conservative, they are no more likely to invalidate statutes, regardless of whether
they employ the Gorsuch test.
D. External Validity: Can the States Shed Light on Federal Law?
As the previous subsection demonstrates, the Gorsuch test has no statistical
relationship with outcomes or litigation trends that would suggest that is
meaningfully more stringent than the intelligible principle standard. But the
question remains: Can the states furnish lessons that are applicable to federal
law? This is the problem of external validity. States are in many ways unique,
starting with the fact, controlled for in the models above, that many of them have
explicit separation of powers provisions in their constitutions.205 In addition, as
Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Miriam Seifter have noted, state
constitutions also profess a much more explicit commitment to majoritarian
democracy than does the U.S. Constitution.206
One could add to this list for quite a while, but for the purposes of assessing
how well implementation of doctrinal formulations at the state level would
translate to the federal level, only certain kinds of differences are likely to be
relevant. Two new studies overviewing the doctrinal landscape in the
nondelegation doctrine highlight the kinds of differences that potentially matter,
together contending that much of what passes for nondelegation doctrine in the
states is not really comparable to the classic nondelegation situation in federal
courts. Professor Joseph Postell, for instance, surveys cases in the states and
concludes that nondelegation cases are not a “monolithic category” at the state
level.207 States examine a wide variety of delegations—delegations of the taxing
power, delegations to private actors, delegations to other institutions besides
regulatory agencies, and even delegations “back to the people through initiative
petitions.”208 Likewise, legal scholar Benjamin Silver observes that “what little
state scholarship there is often misses the breadth and depth of state
nondelegation jurisprudence.”209 Indeed, Silver reinforces Postell’s conclusion

would be necessary to rule out attitudinal explanations entirely. That project is beyond the scope of this article.
205
Rossi, supra note 31, at 1190.
206
Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 141, at 894–95. Of course, this commitment to democracy has
been illusory at best and a sham at worst through many periods of history. See Craig Green, United/States: A
Revolutionary History of American Statehood, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2020) (discussing episodes of states
acting more as bastions of racism, inequality, and minority rule than as great beacons of democracy).
207
Joseph Postell, The Myth of the State Nondelegation Doctrines 12–13 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
208
Id.
209
Benjamin Silver, Nondelegation in the States, 75 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4)
(on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3758233).
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that “states apply nondelegation to many different types of delegates and in a
variety of contexts, sometimes with little coherence on the surface.”210
This Article avoids some of these barriers to external validity by focusing on
delegations of legislative authority to executive branch actors, such as the
governor, agencies, or other institutions exercising what would conventionally
be understood as policymaking or regulatory power. To the extent that other
categories unearthed by Postell and Silver might make extrapolation to the
federal context difficult—for instance, arguments that the legislature has
delegated taxing power to an executive branch actor—I control for these specific
categories of cases in the models above. While it is certainly the case that state
nondelegation cases are less cookie cutter than they are in the federal context,
these efforts to zero in on the cases that largely resemble the kinds of cases the
U.S. Supreme Court hears should reassure.
One obvious difference between state and federal nondelegation cases that
might initially suggest caution in drawing lessons from this data is the drastically
different baseline invalidation rates between the two sovereigns. Even if a state’s
specific doctrinal articulation does not seem to influence outcomes, it remains
the case that state courts invalidate almost 19% of the statutes they review in
nondelegation doctrines211—hardly a trivial amount compared to the almost
nonexistent set of statutes invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court under the
federal doctrine. However, these differences may not be so puzzling once one
considers that the federal government and the state governments maintain fairly
different policy portfolios. The federal government deals much more regularly
with foreign policy and national security, which may explain in part why the
U.S. Supreme Court has so far steered toward very low baseline invalidation
rates, given the deference typically afforded policymakers in this arena and the
risk that a strong baseline invalidation rate would bleed over into cases
implicating these concerns. Indeed, the high number of nondelegation cases in
federal court touching on national security and foreign policy, particularly in the
context of tariffs, lends some support to this interpretation that the mix of
subjects in nondelegation cases could change the baseline invalidation rate. This
change in the baseline may be significant, but the impact of doctrinal
formulation on this baseline rate would presumably be the same—the change in
baseline has no bearing on the ability of doctrinal formulations to decide
concrete cases.

210
211

Id.
See supra fig.2 and accompanying text.
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For all these reasons, questions about external validity, while important to
consider, are not likely to impair the implications of the empirical analysis. The
state nondelegation cases are by far the best evidence available for shedding light
on what to expect for the U.S. Supreme Court.
E. Summary of the Empirical Analysis
Looking at an original dataset of all state supreme court decisions in
nondelegation cases from roughly the middle of the nineteenth century to the
present, we see that several big patterns and findings emerge.
First, and consistent with prior research on the state nondelegation doctrine,
the doctrine does in fact play a much more consistently important role in the
state courts than it does in the federal courts. In the U.S. Supreme Court,
nondelegation challenges are few and far between, and they are almost
invariably unsuccessful.212 In the state courts, by contrast, 18.7% of the 1,668
challenges were successful. To be sure, there are many states and many years
covered in the dataset, so there is still fewer than one nondelegation challenge
per state per year, but this is quite different than the experience in the federal
courts.
Second, I find a significant amount of volatility in the outcomes of these
cases over time, as well as significant differences across states in the shape of
the historical pattern. The existing research on the subject has not documented
this level of volatility, instead characterizing the approach in the state courts as
relatively consistent over time.
Third and finally, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of individual
case outcomes revealed no relationship with the doctrinal formulation a state
maintains. Indeed, the only factors that seem to matter at all relate to the context
in which the court operates vis-à-vis actual delegations and nondelegation
challenges. The analysis revealed that courts were less likely to invalidate
statutes in individual cases when delegation was occurring at a high rate in that
state and when the court had historically deferred, but it also suggested that a
recent history of state legislatures delegating leads courts to respond with a
greater chance of invalidation, albeit not at a statistically significant level.
Overall, though, the key finding is a null finding: even when courts apply core
features of the Gorsuch test, they are no more or less likely to invalidate statutes

212
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 330 (1999) (noting
the federal nondelegation doctrine has had one good year and more than two hundred bad ones).
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than they are when applying tests much more similar to the intelligible principle
standard that the federal courts have employed.
III. THE GORSUCH DILEMMA
What can the findings in Part II tell us about what the U.S. Supreme Court
might do with the nondelegation doctrine, and how successfully it might do it?
In this Part, I elaborate on two implications, although there may well be more.
First, I contend that the results dampen the prospects that a simple change of
doctrine will usher in a systematic, stringent change in practice—a conclusion
that will disappoint those who see in Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in
Gundy a genuine opportunity to rebalance the power between the legislature and
the executive, but that will comfort those who worry about that project. The
Gorsuch test is not unique, and its track record suggests that courts are perfectly
capable of avoiding deploying it to invalidate all or most statutes delegating
power to the executive. Moreover, the intelligible principle approach that Justice
Gorsuch maligns in Gundy is inherently malleable enough to support the
invalidation of statutes at a higher rate than has historically been the case. The
lack of a relationship between doctrinal formulation and case outcomes suggests
that whether a revolution is afoot will show in what the Court does, not in what
it says it is doing. And there are very good reasons to believe that the Court will
not be willing to do much of anything.213
Second, this limitation on what doctrine can accomplish also has significant
implications for how the Court would more vigorously police Congress’s
legislative behavior. Given persistent and unavoidable institutional limitations
on its capacity to oversee the implementation of doctrine in the court system, the
Court would undoubtedly prefer to operationalize its understanding of the
constitutional limitations on delegation in the form of a hard-edged rule—hence,
the attempt to formulate the Gorsuch test in terms of a formalistic line between
policymaking discretion, which cannot be delegated, and articulation of details
and factfinding, which can be. The findings from Part II suggest that the line is
not clear enough to guide decision-making, and without a doctrinal formulation
that can provide ex ante rules that reliably produce the desired level of
heightened scrutiny, the only real option is to rely on ad hoc symbolic
invalidations of legislation under a more chimerical rule or standard. This

213
Cf. Zaring, supra note 174, at 745 (“Separation of powers claims so often fail because of what Laurence
Tribe has characterized as the ‘settled expectations’ check on the logic of constitutional law and that I call the
part-of-the-furniture doctrine.”).
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gesticular approach may succeed in changing Congressional behavior, but it is
likely to carry many imprecisions and undesirable side effects.214
Overall, the empirical analysis adds to the questions raised about whether
the juice is worth the squeeze in invigorating the nondelegation doctrine. At this
point, the nondelegation doctrine has become a symbolic battle in fights over the
future of the administrative state, and many actors, including Supreme Court
Justices, have a vested interest in seeing that project completed. Yet, if it is
concrete and tangible results that we care about and not some form of separation
of powers virtue signaling, then the findings in Part II provide some reason to
doubt whether there will be much of a real payoff (or a real threat), as even the
courts that start from the Gundy baseline fail to take it to its logical endpoint.
A. The Futility of a Doctrinal Shift for Changing Court Behavior
It is almost received wisdom that enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine
would imperil the administrative state. As one commentator put it, “the
movement to expand the nondelegation doctrine doesn’t seek a healthier
relationship between Congress and the administrative state. Instead, it hopes to
roll back the administrative state itself.”215 Even Justice Kagan seems to believe
that a battle between modern government and a nondelegation doctrine with hard
edges would be a battle whose outcome is already decided before it is fought; as
she put it in Gundy, “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of
Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need to give
discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.”216
States would beg to differ. State governments, just like the federal
government, have become modern administrative states in their own right. As
other scholars have documented, state governments are involved in substantial
regulatory policymaking.217 Moreover, as Professor Miriam Seifter
demonstrates, they have done so in much the same mode that the federal
government has—that is, with a powerful executive branch that relies heavily

214
See Walters & Ash, supra note 27 (finding a small effect of nondelegation decisions on state legislative
behavior, but also noting that a decrease in delegation may not be desirable on social welfare metrics).
215
Matt Ford, The Plot to Level the Administrative State, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 14, 2020), https://
newrepublic.com/article/156207/plot-level-administrative-state.
216
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
217
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 140, at 485–86; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 141, at
271; Brian J. Gerber & Paul Teske, Regulatory Policymaking in the American States: A Review of Theories and
Evidence, 53 POL. RSCH. Q. 849, 851 (2000); Susan Webb Yackee, Invisible (and Visible) Lobbying: The Case
of State Regulatory Policymaking, 15 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 322, 330–31 (2015).
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on delegations of authority from the state legislatures.218 This has all occurred
despite the fact that a substantial number of states employ elements of Justice
Gorsuch’s strict approach to nondelegation,219 including a requirement that state
legislatures only leave details to be filled in by governors, and that they permit
only executive factfinding and not executive lawmaking. The use of these
doctrinal forms has not prevented the development of effective and powerful
executive institutions in the states.220 How could this be?
Ultimately, the findings suggest that Justice Gorsuch’s test is just as
irreducibly ambiguous as the intelligible principle standard.221 Even
conservative or libertarian proponents of the nondelegation doctrine have
recognized as much.222 There are countless examples from the states of relatively
lenient implementation of these categorical distinctions, as well as relatively
strict applications of standards that resemble the intelligible principle standard.
Take just a few:
 Massachusetts: Despite having a strict separation of powers clause in
its state constitution,223 being classified by others as a “strict” or
“strong” nondelegation state by others,224 and clearly adhering to a hard
and fast line between delegation of policymaking authority versus
details of implementation,225 Massachusetts did not see its supreme
court invalidate a statute under the nondelegation doctrine during the
period of study. Exemplifying this doctrine-defying pattern is the
relatively recent case Commonwealth v. Clemmey, in which the Court

218

Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 140, at 487.
See supra tbl.1.
220
See supra fig.3.
221
Hickman, supra note 15, at 37 (“Which subjects are important, and which are of less interest, often will
be subjective. . . . Likewise, seemingly minor alterations or additions to regulatory schemes often yield massive
legal or economic liabilities or substantial unintended consequences.”); Coan, supra note 15, at 146 (describing
the Gorsuch approach as a “combination of exceedingly mushy standards”); Sunstein, supra note 74, at 327
(arguing “the overwhelming likelihood is that judicial enforcement of the doctrine would produce ad hoc, highly
discretionary rulings,” so much so that “we might even say that judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine
would violate the conventional doctrine—since it could not be enforced without delegating, without clear
standards, a high degree of discretionary lawmaking authority to the judiciary”).
222
Michael Rappaport, for instance, described Gorsuch’s test as “pretty indeterminate” and argued for a
stricter approach that distinguishes between (1) “traditional areas of executive responsibility, such as foreign and
military affairs, spending, and the management of government property,” and (2) other areas involving domestic
private rights. Rappaport proposed to categorically limit delegation in the latter. Michael B. Rappaport, A Two
Tiered and Categorical Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine 2 (San Diego Legal Stud., Paper No. 20-471,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3710048.
223
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30.
224
Rossi, supra note 31, at 1191.
225
See supra tbl.1.
219
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entertained but rejected an argument that the state legislature delegated
legislative authority to the Department of Environmental Protection to
define the contents of an agricultural exemption from wetlands
protections.226 The statute in question stated a general prohibition on
the altering of wetlands, but it also provided that these prohibitions do
not apply to “work performed for normal maintenance or improvement
of land in agricultural use.”227 According to the state legislature, the
exemption was “necessary to balance the need to protect wetlands and
other fragile habitats with the ‘future economic viability of . . . farms
[in the Commonwealth].’”228 However, the legislature did not attempt
to define any of these terms in a way that would determine the actual
content of that balancing policy, instead expressly delegating that task
to the executive.229 Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
brushed aside the argument that the legislature had left a policy question
for the agency, stating the following:
The Legislature was quite clear as to the policy decision it had
made and wanted implemented. That policy was that the
interests of environmental protection and agriculture were to be
balanced in a way that protected “routine and long standing farm
operations.” The delegation of the definitions of “land in
agricultural use” and “normal maintenance or improvement” of
such land simply directed the department to work out the details
necessary to the implementation of the policy.230

 Nevada: Nevada adheres to the second prong of the Gorsuch test,
holding that it is not a delegation of policymaking authority for the state
legislature to give executive actors the “power to determine some fact
and state of things upon which the law . . . makes its own operation
depend.”231 In Clark County v. Luqman, the Nevada Supreme Court
considered whether provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substance
Act, which allowed the state pharmacy board to “classify drugs into
various schedules according to the drug’s propensity for harm and
abuse,” violated the nondelegation doctrine.232 The Court held that,
while “the standards for classifying drugs into specific schedules are

226
227
228
229
230
231
232

849 N.E.2d 844, 848 (2006).
Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 40).
Id. at 849 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
State ex rel. Ginocchio v. Shaughnessy, 217 P. 581, 583 (Nev. 1923).
697 P.2d 107, 110 (Nev. 1985).
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phrased in general terms,” ultimately the board was “placed into the role
of a fact finder” and had “merely been delegated the duty of applying
its findings to the legislative scheme.”233 While the Court made this
conclusion sound relatively mechanical, it is patently obvious that this
delegation left all of the important policy questions about
criminalization of particular controlled substances to the board, blurring
the line between legislative and executive authority.
 California: California employs a more liberal approach to
nondelegation, requiring only that the legislature resolve “fundamental”
policy questions and provide “adequate direction” for administrative
agencies’ exercise of “quasi-legislative” authority.234 But in Clean Air
Constituency v. California State Air Resources Board, the California
Supreme Court adopted a narrowed interpretation of an exception to
pollution control regulations to avoid a delegation problem.235 The
California Air Resources Board (CARB) had promulgated regulations
of nitrogen oxides pollution from vehicles pursuant to legislative
command. The same statute authorized CARB to delay the regulations
for “extraordinary and compelling reasons only.”236 After the onset of
the energy crisis, CARB attempted to delay the effective date of the
regulations, citing the “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
provision.237 In holding that the extraordinary and compelling reasons
provision delegated discretion to delay only for “reasons which relate
to the effective implementation of the installation program and to the
clearly expressed purposes of the Air Resources Act,” the California
Supreme Court held that the provision would “constitute an invalid
delegation of powers if its scope were not limited to reasons relating to
the purposes of the act.”238
 Kentucky: In Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System v.
Attorney General of the Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court
acknowledged Kentucky’s traditional adherence to the federal
intelligible principle standard.239 Nevertheless, the court struck a highly

233
234
235
236
237
238
239

Id.
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd., 405 P.3d 1087, 1100 (Cal. 2017).
523 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1974).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 624.
132 S.W.3d 770, 785 (Ky. 2003).
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technical statute reforming the judicial retirement system,240 concluding
that it had never applied the intelligible principle standard in so
“toothless” a fashion as the federal courts and bragging that “Kentucky
holds to a higher standard.”241
These cases are, of course, only cherry-picked examples of instances where the
state courts were able to reach a result at odds with the more general tenor of the
state’s nondelegation doctrine. I do not offer them as representative samples, but
rather as exemplars of the interminable discretion available to judges attempting
to implement them in concrete cases. They illustrate why, notwithstanding real
differences in how state courts understand the nondelegation doctrine, there is
no systematic difference in outcomes, as well as why most individual states have
not exhibited anything approaching consistency in their invalidation rate over
time. The doctrinal categorizations are so flimsily defined that it is possible to
reason to any result one wishes in individual cases without doing violence to the
more general statement of the rule.242
There are, of course, several important caveats to this interpretation of the
cases and the data. First, a problem with any observational data on court
decisions is that the inputs might not be constant over time.243 State supreme
courts respond to the cases that are brought to them, and these cases may vary
in their composition due to any number of factors (e.g., the legislature engages
in more or less bold delegation over time, or the cases that challenge delegations
are an unrepresentative sample, perhaps because of selection bias or strategic
considerations).244 To some extent, I control for these kinds of problems in the
empirical analysis by accounting for past and current delegating behavior by the
state legislature245 and by examining models where the outcome variables are
counts of cases and invalidations, which should not be as susceptible to
equilibrium effects.246 However, these controls and robustness checks are not
perfect, and the chance that the decided nondelegation cases do not represent

240

Id.
Id. at 782.
242
Accord Sunstein, supra note 74, at 326–27 (arguing “[t]he distinction between ‘executive’ and
‘legislative’ power cannot depend on anything qualitative; the issue is a quantitative one. The real question is:
How much executive discretion is too much to count as ‘executive’? No metric is easily available to answer that
question”).
243
See supra notes 190–201 and accompanying text.
244
This may be less of a problem before the 1900s, before state high courts shifted to a primarily
discretionary docket. See Stephen L. Wasby, State Court Discretionary Jurisdiction and Federal Habeas
Corpus, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 89, 89 (1999).
245
See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
246
See supra notes 190–201 and accompanying text.
241
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how the court would have resolved other challenges that could have been
brought but were not remains an important limitation on the implications of the
analysis.
Second, there is also a generally higher rate of invalidation at the state level
(18.7%), which might suggest that the nondelegation doctrine, whatever the
precise articulation, is hardwired for more stringent application and that federal
courts are outliers in treating the intelligible principle standard as a de facto
categorical rule of deference. On some level, this actually reinforces the point
that the various doctrinal articulations are essentially capable of any use, but it
may well be true that the federal courts are an outlier. Yet there are good reasons
to believe that this generally higher invalidation rate at the state level primarily
reflects the general divisions of labor in a federalist system rather than something
inherent about how courts in general resolve nondelegation problems.247 The
federal government has taken the lead on many issues of policymaking,
including in some areas where the states simply have no authority, which could
heighten the stakes of invalidation of federal statutes compared to invalidations
of state laws. As some have suggested, state courts might even be contributing
to this division of authority precisely by using the nondelegation doctrine more
aggressively at the state level, foisting more responsibility on the federal
Congress to pick up the slack and the federal courts to sign the permission slip.248
After all, problems must be solved by one sovereign or another.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the overwhelming implication from the data,
along with even a casual engagement with individual cases, is that doctrine
places very few constraints on judges as they review the propriety of delegations
of state legislative authority. The alternatives to the intelligible principle
standard, including the Gorsuch test, do not yet have a sufficiently definite
meaning to lend themselves to consistent application. In some sense, this is not
an earth-shattering point: others have pointed out the fundamental ambiguity of

247
Cf. Rick Hills, Attack of the Clones: How State Courts’ Adoption of SCOTUS’ Constitutional Doctrinal
Disputes Defeats the Purpose of Federalism, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 4, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/
10/attack-of-clones-how-state-courts.html (critiquing the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in In re Certified
Questions From W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1 (2020), as “studiously oblivious about the distinctive
practical and legal problems and opportunities created by executive power in state governments” and noting how
that should shape the nondelegation doctrine’s application in the states); see also Aaron Saiger, Chevron and
Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 557 (2014) (noting that Chevron deference
has “not been embraced with enthusiasm or consistency in state administrative law” and that this is likely due to
the fact that Chevron is better suited to features of the federal regulatory system).
248
Cf. Saiger, supra note 247, at 557 (arguing that, from a federalist standpoint, there are good reasons for
both a heightened nondelegation standard in the states and a lightened nondelegation standard—but, at any rate,
plenty of reason to think the doctrine should be different to reflect different circumstances).
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the lines that the Gorsuch test attempts to draw between legislative power and
executive power.249 What the empirical analysis in Part II adds is real-world
evidence of this ambiguity in the form of wildly varying patterns of decisionmaking across the states. These data make it very difficult to maintain any hope
that the Court’s adoption of Justice Gorsuch’s test will deliver a return of an
exiled Constitution or foreshadow the end of administrative government.
B. The Judicial Economy of Nondelegation
This observation raises important questions: Why is it that Justice Gorsuch
wants to frame his test as a sort of foil to the intelligible principle test? Why not
simply begin to strike down more statutes under the intelligible principle test
(that is, move the line for what counts as “intelligible”)? Perhaps one answer is
that Justice Gorsuch believes that the line between “policy” and “details” (or
“facts”) is more determinate ex ante—and therefore more judicially
administrable—than the line between “intelligible enough” and “not intelligible
enough.” That is, Justice Gorsuch may believe that he has identified a line that
qualifies as a rule, as that category is defined by the literature on rules and
standards.250 If this is a correct account of what is motivating Justice Gorsuch, it
is understandable why he would want to push this narrative. The Court must not
only consider what it would do in the cases that come before it, but also how
what it says will shape congressional behavior ex ante and how lower courts (or
even future Supreme Courts) will implement whatever line the Court chooses.
One can see this concern bubbling to the surface in the Gundy decision itself,
where Justice Alito expressed deep discomfort with singling out SORNA’s pre249
See Hickman, supra note 28 (“But finding a better and more rigorous standard for discerning between
acceptable from unacceptable grants of rulemaking authority is very, very hard. . . . Justice Gorsuch’s first effort,
contrasting ‘mere “details”’ with rules governing final conduct, seems too susceptible to the whim of the
moment.”); see also Lawson, supra note 4, at 361 (criticizing a version of the standard as “pretty lame” and
“almost absurdly self-referential” and therefore not “manageable”); Hall, supra note 12, at 179 (discussing the
Gorsuch test’s “lack of doctrinal clarity”); Sunstein, supra note 74, at 338 (noting the “difficulty of drawing
lines between prohibited and permitted delegations”).
250
The literature here is voluminous, but it mostly treats the distinction between rules and standards as
inhering in the extent to which they provide answers to regulated parties before or after adjudication—that is,
the extent to which they limit judicial discretion. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE, at xvii (Tony Honor &
Joseph Raz eds., 1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–
60 (1992) (defining rules as legal commands that can be understood ex ante—that is, before a judicial
determination—and standards as quintessentially ex post—that is, we only know what the law is in an individual
case when the case is adjudicated); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257–58 (1974); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26–27 (1992). For a discussion applying this literature to the context of
nondelegation, see generally Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards
Dilemma and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189 (1999).
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Act offenders provision for special treatment,251 as well as in Justice Gorsuch’s
claim that his test would not spell the end of the administrative state since
Congress could legislate to the rule.252 Both of these passages suggest that the
Court is wary of simply recalibrating existing standards in an ad hoc fashion,
providing no ex ante guidance to Congress and the lower courts, both of which
are positioned to do far more in the way of actually constraining delegation.253
As easy as it is to see why Justice Gorsuch would want to see his formulation
of the test in Gundy as meaningfully improving the predictability of decisionmaking in nondelegation cases, that hope is belied by the data from the states.
This is not to say that the Court will be deterred from giving federal legislation
more scrutiny regardless of whether they can articulate firm, rule-like limits on
delegation. In fact, the best evidence suggests that they will, much as they have
ratcheted up the scrutiny of agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutory and
regulatory provisions, all without overturning the foundational Chevron
doctrine.254 Whether the doctrine formally changes or not, it would be a good
bet that the Court will change the tenor of its review of nondelegation challenges.
But the data analysis above suggests that, instead of being able to shape
congressional and lower court behavior ex ante through articulation of a clear
and knowable line dividing permissible from impermissible delegations, the
only real option the Court has is to use ex post invalidations selectively as

251
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing interest in
revisiting the Court’s approach to nondelegation cases but refusing to do it in this case alone because “it would
be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment”).
252
Id. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that “enforcing the Constitution’s demands” would not
“spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state.’ . . . Respecting the separation of powers forecloses no
substantive outcomes. It only requires us to respect along the way one of the most vital of the procedural
protections of individual liberty found in our Constitution”).
253
Some empirical research on lower courts suggests that ex ante rules, perhaps not surprisingly, constrain
lower courts’ behavior more than open-textured standards. See e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial
Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1537 (2008).
254
See Nathan Richardson, Deference is Dead (Long Live Chevron) 38 (Aug. 18, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3676695) (recounting that the Court
has deferred to the agency in only one of fifteen cases in which it cited Chevron since 2015); see also Michael
Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2015) (“Chevron has had less of
an impact than this attention implies. . . . [Judges] do not defer as much as the doctrine seems to require. Rather,
they have narrowed the circumstances in which Chevron, by its own terms, applies and invoke Chevron only
intermittently in those circumstances.”); Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 37, 41 (2018) (“The Chevron doctrine is often expressed as a rigid algorithm—the two steps—
which makes any deviation by the Court quite noticeable. Yet, despite all the fanfare, it is now well known that
the Supreme Court itself applies Chevron inconsistently at best.”). But see Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger
Spamann, Does the Supreme Court Really Not Apply Chevron When It Should?, 57 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 81, 82
(2019) (empirically demonstrating that the Supreme Court consistently applies Chevron when it should be the
relevant decision rule).
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symbolic signals.255 In this Part, I argue that judicial economy suggests a
drastically diminished impact through this strategy, and some undesirable
consequences for which the Court would do well to account.256
This account starts with a recognition of some basic institutional limits
within which the Court must operate—the Supreme Court’s ability to change the
law is fundamentally limited by institutional features of the federal judiciary. As
Professor Andrew Coan persuasively argues, the limited capacity of the Court
to hear cases constrains the Court’s enforcement of legal or constitutional
norms.257 The Court avoids commitments to doctrinal projects that strain its
capacity, not so much because of anything like the “passive virtues,”258 but
because of sheer rational calculation. Because the Court can hear only a small
fraction of the petitions for certiorari presented to it and because only a small
fraction of those petitions can involve nondelegation challenges, the Court must
be judicious about whether its doctrinal moves will generate more litigation than
the Court has the capacity to attend to.259 This is especially true in what Coan
calls “high-volume domains”260—those “implicating the validity of a large
255
Accord Hickman, supra note 15, at 46–47. This move is common in the Court’s recent structural
constitutional decisions. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 50 (2017) (“Decisions like Free Enterprise have a ‘this far but no further’ feel, which connects to the
Court’s resistance to innovative administrative structures and regulatory regimes.”). See generally Zaring, supra
note 174 (arguing that the Court’s remedies in structural separation of powers have occasionally been shocking
but have nevertheless generally been ineffectual in changing government). Further, although it goes beyond the
scope of this Article, we find in parallel research that the doctrine a state adopts can shape legislative behavior,
just not in predictable ways. See Walters & Ash, supra note 27. For instance, we find that the “fill in the details”
approach is actually associated with more delegation in subsequent statutes, and the procedural safeguards
approach (a liberal test in theory) is associated with less delegation. Id.
256
Cf. Hall, supra note 12, at 189 (noting that Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were “symbolic
check[s]” that had little impact).
257
ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING (2019); see also Coan, supra note 15, at 142 (arguing the limitations of judicial capacity
applicable in other constitutional domains are also applicable to the nondelegation doctrine). Similar points about
the way the Court changes its formulation of doctrine to fit institutional realities can be found in Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997).
258
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961)
(analyzing doctrines that generalize on judicial timing and restraints).
259
See Coan, supra note 15, at 142. An important caveat here, which Coan acknowledges, is that changes
to the Supreme Court’s own quality-control norms might permit the Court to expand its docket. Id. at 146–47.
Were it to do so, perhaps through a greatly expanded “shadow docket,” see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor
General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 125 (2019), the Court could relax the need for
predictable rules and simply manage the onslaught of cases that would result from implementation of a relatively
ambiguous rule or standard. See Coan, supra note 15, at 143. Of course, doing so would also stretch the
legitimacy of the Court, which relies in large part on its power to persuade through thoroughly researched and
reasoned opinions, but which necessitates capping the number of cases the Court can hear at a very small number.
260
Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 774
(2016).

WALTERS_2.2.22

480

2/3/2022 10:15 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:417

number of federal statutes” in which the Court feels compelled to review nearly
every case decided by the lower courts.261 In such domains, the limits on the
capacity to hear cases “create an almost irresistible pressure on the Court to cast
its decisions in the form of clear but clumsy categorical rules or to defer to the
constitutional decisions of other government actors.”262
The reason for this pressure is simple. The ultimate implementation of
doctrine pronounced from on high is shaped by other actors—namely, lower
courts and future courts.263 As political scientists explain, the Supreme Court sits
atop a bureaucracy—the federal judicial bureaucracy—and faces all of the
familiar principal-agent challenges that principals face.264 There are hierarchical
control considerations (e.g., how much discretion to leave to the more numerous
courts of appeals that will, as a practical matter, have the last word on most
issues) and intertemporal considerations (e.g., how much discretion to leave for
future courts, both at the lower levels of the judiciary and also on the Supreme
Court, as personnel changes or justices’ ideology or philosophy drifts).265 A
clear rule of decision entitled to the benefit of stare decisis delivers substantial
value to a current Supreme Court. In addition to making it far easier for
Congress—the ultimate target of the nondelegation doctrine—to conform its
behavior to the Court’s understanding of what the Constitution requires,266 clear

261

Coan, supra note 15, at 143.
Id.
263
See generally Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Scott
Comparato, Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010)
(modeling the Supreme Court’s efforts to constrain both lower courts and future Supreme Courts through its
decision-making); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing
a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994)
(modeling the relationship between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts by borrowing “principal-agent”
constructs); Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political
Hierarchy: An Information Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101
(2000) (offering a strategic auditing model to explain the Supreme Court’s hierarchical monitoring of lower
courts); Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Consider the Source (and the Message): Supreme Court Justices and
Strategic Audits of Lower Court Decisions, 65 POL. RSCH. Q. 385 (2012) (offering the same).
264
See Westerland et al., supra note 263, at 892–94.
265
See id. (analyzing “horizontal” and “vertical” principal-agent relations between the contemporary
Supreme Court and (1) future Supreme Courts and (2) lower courts, while also exploring how subsequent circuits
and Supreme Courts present additional challenges for the contemporary principal).
266
As a general matter, relatively clear rules make it easier for the target of a law to comply. See Kaplow,
supra note 250, at 577 (“Rules cost more to promulgate; standards cost more to enforce.”). Of course, this could
be spun as a negative as well. The clarity of a rule can encourage the regulated actor to cut as close as possible
to the line between unlawful and lawful delegation, whereas a less clear standard might cause the regulated actor
to steer well clear of the line. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384–85 (1985)
(“By specifying a sharp line between forbidden and permissible conduct, rules permit and encourage activity up
to the boundary of permissible conduct.”); id. at 386 (“Using rules to define the scope and nature of the
subordinate’s authority gives the subordinate ready-made safe havens that allow avoidance of responsibility or
262
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rules solve the institutional control problems within the courts by making it easy
for the Court to observe noncompliance and raising the cost of departure from
the rule for the lower courts.267 However, such clear doctrinal rules do not
materialize on command, and, as can be seen in the state nondelegation context,
there are certain areas of the law that stubbornly resist reduction.
Assuming that the lack of a hard-edged rule does not deter the Court from
pursuing a renewed nondelegation doctrine, the Court is left with two bad
choices,268 although one may be better than the other. First, the Court could
continue to rely on the basic contours of the relatively simple general intelligible
principle approach but attempt a course correction through selective invalidation
of statutes.269 Call this the “shock and awe” approach: the Court would use its
limited capacity to review statutes to occasionally remind Congress that the
nondelegation doctrine exists, effectively moving the line for what counts as
“intelligible,” but not so much that it threatens to grind the government to a halt.
A more tailored variation on this might be to more explicitly incorporate the
major questions doctrine into the nondelegation doctrine, pegging the
intelligibility of a statutory principle in part to how big an impact the statute
would have.270 This approach has the hallmarks of governance by standard, and

exercise of authority contrary to the objectives of the superior.”).
267
See Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial
Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504, 504 (2008) (“Vague rulings decrease the likelihood of compliance.”). Of
course, as Staton and Vanberg point out, the lack of compliance may be worth the tradeoff if it delivers other
benefits, such as reduced decision costs in an uncertain legal environment. Id. at 505. See generally HRAFN
ASGEIRSSON, THE NATURE AND VALUE OF VAGUENESS IN THE LAW (2020) (offering a more linguistic,
normative, and theoretical exploration of the functions of vagueness in law). For a literature review on how the
Supreme Court uses the content and substance of opinions to control outcomes in the judicial bureaucracy, see
Jeffrey R. Lax, The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 131 (2011).
268
There is a third option, but it is probably suboptimal from Justice Gorsuch’s perspective (insofar as it
would be, by definition, less transformative): the Court could articulate more specific rules to govern specific
permutations of the nondelegation problem (for instance, by categorically banning delegation in certain subject
matter areas, like criminal law). Coan, supra note 15, at 149. It is worth noting, though, that the Court’s
conservative wing may find it difficult to cobble together a majority on particular issues to single out for special
treatment. This may have even been the case in Gundy, where Justice Alito’s reticence to single out SORNA
might have reflected his more deferential attitude when it comes to criminal law matters. See id. at 148.
269
In some sense, this approach invokes the law and economic literature on optimal deterrence. See, e.g.,
Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241
(2007) (using assumptions from deterrence literature to discuss the tax penalty regime that would result in
optimal reliance); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)
(discussing factors that affect an optimal amount of enforcement).
270
See Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 986 (2018) (noting the ways that
several of the Court’s “major questions” cases, like FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000), seem better analyzed as applications of a nascent “as-applied” nondelegation principle than as ordinary
Chevron).
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it has many associated benefits and drawbacks.271 On the benefits side, this
approach would allow the Court to achieve an almost surgical level of precision
in imposing limits that transgress constitutional limits, as understood by the
Court.272 The tradeoff is that what Professor Colin Diver called the
“transparency” of the law would suffer,273 and Congress would not be quite as
able to adjust its behavior to conform to a knowable legal norm, nor would the
lower courts necessarily get it right.
Second, the Court could try to build on Justice Gorsuch’s attempt to
categorically shift the line to focus more on the policy-details dichotomy, giving
it more content, and therefore perhaps more predictability and “rule-ness,” but
also driving up the complexity of the inquiry. Imposing slightly more rule-like
limits on delegation would, so the thinking goes, obviate the need for quite so
much costly ex post monitoring. There are, however, likely upper bounds to just
how concrete this line could become without losing much of the economy of
rules.274 The Court could devote an extraordinary amount of time to building out
a complex jurisprudence of ever-more precise rules for policing delegation,
detracting from other important aspects of the Court’s work. In all likelihood,
the most it can hope for is a marginally more rule-like statement of the Gorsuch
test.
There is, however, potentially a false economy in the use of relatively
imprecise rules. As the law and economics literature makes clear, a simple rule
is not necessarily better than a simpler standard.275 Lower courts may encounter
hard cases before the Supreme Court has had a chance to perfect its test. If the
Court disagrees with the lower court’s decision, it must correct the
misperception to prevent the lower court’s decision from taking on a life of its

271
See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR.
L. REV. 23, 42–43 (2000); Kaplow, supra note 250, at 584; Schlag, supra note 266, at 384–89.
272
See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 67 (1983) (using
the term congruent to describe whether a rule has the quality of precisely achieving its “underlying policy
objective”). Standards are almost per se congruent, as they involve an ex post decision considering all of the
relevant facts to the case at hand. See Kaplow, supra note 250, at 586 (clarifying the view that “rules tend to be
over- and underinclusive relative to standards”).
273
Diver, supra note 272.
274
Much of the rules and standards literature ignores a cross-cutting dimension of simplicity versus
complexity, instead assuming that rules are always simple and standards are always complex. See Adam I.
Muchmore, Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 171, 180 fig.1 (2013); Kaplow,
supra note 250, at 565–66. Simple, imprecise rules can be made more complex and precise, but this changes the
character of the rule and adds to the implementation costs, much as the shift to an equivalently simple standard
(like the intelligible principle standard) might do.
275
Kaplow, supra note 250, at 589–90 (noting that, once the relative complexity of a rule or standard is
introduced into the calculus, a complex standard may sometimes trump a simple rule).
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own, which imposes opportunity costs, given the Court’s limited docket.276 In
addition, general rules make it costly to reverse course if the Court decides to
change its tack.277 By wedding itself to a particular articulation of the test, the
Court may implicitly disapprove of other formulations that are irreconcilable
with it but which, in hindsight, would be preferable. To make this concern more
concrete, one can already see this problem arising in the state cases, where courts
sporadically mix “fill in the details” language with intelligible principle
language in their articulation of the nondelegation rule.278 The layering of
different articulations of the standard is one particularly incoherent response to
the problem of building law iteratively. To avoid this, the Court might have to
incur the cost of changing the doctrine more explicitly.
Not only do such rules require much the same kind of costly back-end
monitoring and adjustment that an informal course correction would require, but
they also create inefficiencies of their own. For instance, the use of marginally
more rule-like language can make it easier for Congress to guess what kinds of
details are and are not required, but that very phenomenon can cause Congress
to make decisions that, contextually, make bad policy—as when Congress is
forced to make policy determinations about which it lacks any information.279
In essence, by setting up categorical lines that are marginally clearer, there is a
risk that courts will induce Congress to legislate to the test—that is, Congress
may design legislation that passes the Court’s test but fails to provide the very
best answers to the problem Congress seeks to solve.280 Second, if the Court has
to worry about strains on its judicial capacity, the articulation of the “stringent
but vague”281 Gorsuch test might be the worst of all possible worlds. The attempt
276

See Coan, supra note 15, at 143.
Cf. Ozan O. Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 899 (2016) (contending that
behavioral and economic considerations, not Article V’s high threshold for amendment, explains much of the
path dependence in constitutional law).
278
See, e.g., State v. Ariz. Mines Supply Co., 484 P.2d 619, 625 (Ariz. 1971) (“Under the doctrine of
‘separation of powers’ the legislature alone possesses the lawmaking power and, while it cannot completely
delegate this power to any other body, it may allow another body to fill in the details of legislation already
enacted.”); id. (“The object to be accomplished, or the thing permitted may be specified, and the rest left to the
agency of others, with better opportunities of accomplishing the object, or doing the thing understandingly.”
(quoting Peters v. Frye, 71 Ariz. 30, 35 (1950))).
279
It is of course true that Congress sometimes leaves policy choices to the discretion of an agency because
of a failure to come to a political agreement, but surely in some situations the lack of agreement is in fact
informational.
280
Cf. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect
Oversight, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 616 (2007) (“Under these conditions, oversight increases the quality of
proposed regulations, reduces the frequency of regulation, and distorts the policymaking agency’s effort
allocation toward those tasks that the overseer can observe. This last effect introduces an inefficiency that both
the agency and the overseer would prefer to eliminate.”).
281
Coan, supra note 15, at 149.
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to formalize lines holds out more targets for litigants, practically inviting a
substantial wave of litigation. Wherever there is a plausible argument that
Congress has left more than the discretion to fill up the details in the process of
implementation, litigants will have a potential lawsuit, and many of these cases
will have to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.282 By comparison, the
intelligible principle standard, even were it to result in the occasional symbolic
invalidation, would retain all of the right deterrent qualities: It would deter
would-be litigants, since the uncertainty of a more open-ended standard would
lower the expected value of challenging any given statute; and it would also
deter Congress from engaging in objectionable forms of delegation, perhaps
even more so than with an ill-defined rule, because Congress (and we’ll assume
it’s a Congress that cares to see its policies implemented) cannot know ex ante
which statutes will be struck.283 This scenario resembles an audit process, which
can have salutary behavioral effects if well designed.284 By providing more
clarity in a slightly more defined rule, by contrast, the Court introduces more
risk that Congress will conform to the letter of the rule while accomplishing the
delegation that the Court wishes to police. In some sense, the uncertainty about
what the courts will do is an asset when it comes to deterrence.
For all of these reasons, it may be that the devil the U.S. Supreme Court
knows (the intelligible principle standard) is better than the devil it doesn’t (the
Gorsuch test or some similar formulation).285 Nothing prevents the Court from
sending symbolic messages to Congress under the intelligible principle standard.
Nothing guarantees that the intelligible principle standard should result in
categorical deference. It may well be that such an approach would serve the
Court’s aims better than an attempt to draw a new, untested line between policy,
on the one hand, and details or facts, on the other. More generally, the takeaway
is that the Court’s desire to formulate hard-edged rules, while understandable,
cannot get out ahead of its capacity to define the problem in precise terms.

282

Id. at 146–47.
It is a familiar point that ex post adjudication under a standards regime may result in overdeterrence.
See Kaplow, supra note 250, at 618. In fact, this last point highlights a puzzle as to why Justice Gorsuch sought
to provide more definite rules in the first place. It is widely assumed that Justice Gorsuch would prefer very
minimal delegation from Congress, and it may be that a vague but stringent doctrine would have a maximal
deterrent effect.
284
See Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 33, 38 (2017) (urging attention to enforcement
styles, including what Sohoni calls “crackdowns”— temporary aggressive enforcement of legal norms or rules—
as a matter of good governance). See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95
MINN. L. REV. 9 (2010) (arguing for a process of “cascad[ing] retreat” as an effective means of deterring
undesirable conduct).
285
This point is underscored by parallel research using these data, which finds that the fill-in-the-details
formulation might well backfire if the goal is to reduce delegation. See Walters & Ash, supra note 27.
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CONCLUSION
In the spirit of treating states as “laboratories,”286 this Article looks to how
state courts have implemented a wide variety of doctrinal formulations of the
nondelegation principle over most of American history. Taking a data-driven
approach, this Article contributes a new perspective on the likely impacts of a
reinvigoration of nondelegation doctrine in the federal courts, and its findings
caution against overstating the case for or against the nondelegation doctrine.
The lack of any detectable impact on outcomes of the different formulations
employed by state courts, including ones quite similar to Justice Gorsuch’s
proposed framework from his dissent in Gundy, should inspire a reconsideration
of whether the nondelegation doctrine matters much in the real world. To be
sure, the experience in the states is bound to be different than what might be
expected at the federal level.287 That said, the state decisions are by far the best
data we have about what to expect when we’re expecting the Court to take on
the task of resuscitating the doctrine, and the lessons gleaned from the states
should inform strategies moving forward, whether one supports or opposes the
project in general.

286
Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1755 (2010) (studying state court statutory interpretation
methodologies in the hope that these “developments may be used to inform and change federal statutory theory
and practice”).
287
See Saiger, supra note 247, at 556–57 (noting that state administrative law has not received Chevron
with enthusiasm).

